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CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 1325
For nearly a quarter-century, federal courts have deferred to administrative
agencies’ statutory interpretations under the renowned Chevron doctrine.
Despite Chevron’s widespread appeal, its theoretical foundations remain
contested. Judges and academics have debated whether Chevron rests on a
theory of congressional delegation, administrative expertise, the executive
branch’s political responsiveness and accountability, agency deliberative
rationality, concerns for national regulatory uniformity, or inherent executive
power. This Article challenges the terms of this longstanding debate by
demonstrating that Chevron does not rest exclusively upon any of these
competing rationales. Instead, Chevron forges a pragmatic consensus between
several leading theories, none of which can be properly considered redundant.
By embracing pluralism and practical wisdom in statutory interpretation,
Chevron furnishes an enduring response to the fragmentation of contemporary
legal and political theory.
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court appeared to abandon
Chevron’s consensus by endorsing congressional delegation as the touchstone
for Chevron deference. By all accounts, Mead has sown confusion and discord
in the circuit courts. What Mead’s critics have failed to appreciate, however,
is that the Supreme Court actually employs the congressional delegation
theory instrumentally to sustain Chevron’s consensus: where agency decisionmaking processes satisfy all of the leading rationales for deference, the Court
applies Chevron. Conversely, where any of the leading rationales for
deference remains unsatisfied, the Court evaluates agency statutory
interpretations under the residual Skidmore test.
The time has come to dismantle Mead’s delegation fiction and expressly
reconstruct Chevron’s pluralist consensus as the definitive test for Chevron
deference. By candidly reaffirming Chevron’s consensus, the Supreme Court
would clarify the scope of Chevron’s domain and enhance judicial
transparency and accountability in statutory interpretation.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a quarter-century has passed since the Supreme Court decided
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., holding that
federal courts must defer to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations
of ambiguous statutes.1 Although Chevron has since become “the most cited
case in modern public law,”2 its theoretical underpinnings remain uncertain.
1

Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006); see also STEPHEN
G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 289
(5th ed. 2002) (observing that Chevron has been cited more times than Brown v. Board of
Education, Roe v. Wade, and Marbury v. Madison combined).
2
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Scholars have debated whether Chevron deference rests upon a theory of
congressional delegation, administrative expertise, agency deliberative
rationality, the executive branch’s political responsiveness and accountability,
concerns for national regulatory uniformity, or inherent executive power.3 The
contest between these competing foundational theories for Chevron deference
reflects longstanding divisions over the proper relationship between agencies,
courts, Congress, and the Chief Executive in the administrative state.
While scholars continue to ponder whether congressional delegation, agency
expertise, or another comprehensive theory constitutes Chevron’s optimal
foundation, this Article offers a different perspective. Returning to the text of
Justice Stevens’s unanimous opinion, I argue that Chevron does not rest
exclusively on any single comprehensive theory of court-agency relations.
Although the Chevron decision pays its respects to several of the grand
theoretical movements of its era – legal realism, civic republicanism,
neopluralism, public choice theory, and unitary executive theory – it makes no
effort to arbitrate between these movements or their respective visions of
statutory interpretation. Instead, Chevron’s methodology is pluralistic and
conciliatory: courts should defer to the EPA’s reasonable interpretations of the
Clean Air Act precisely because all the leading theories of the administrative
state support deference to agencies under the circumstances presented.
The genius of Justice Stevens’s Chevron opinion is its insight that jurists
who espouse fundamentally different views regarding the relationship between
courts and administrative agencies in our federal system could still endorse
judicial deference to the EPA under the circumstances presented in Chevron.
A decade earlier, political philosopher John Rawls had proposed that pluralistic
societies could achieve greater political stability and social cohesion by forging
an “overlapping consensus” between competing comprehensive theories of
“justice” based on citizens’ shared conception of “justice as fairness.”4 Cass

3

See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115
YALE L.J. 2280, 2297-2301 (2006) (inherent executive power); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of
Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002) (administrative expertise); Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001)
(congressional delegation); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV.
83, 87 (1994) (agency deliberative rationality); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases
per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review
of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred
Fifty Cases] (concerns for national regulatory uniformity); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2587 (2006)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury] (the executive branch’s political responsiveness and
accountability).
4 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3, 340, 508-10 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE]. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping
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Sunstein would later build upon Rawls’s insight, arguing that judges should
seek consensus on the outcome of particular cases even when they
fundamentally disagree about the higher-level theory that justifies the shared
result.5 In a similar spirit, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the unanimous Court
in Chevron frames the EPA’s decision-making process as a locus of theoretical
consensus between the leading rationales for deference, endowing Chevron
deference with an uncommon degree of political stability.6 That Chevron has
become the preeminent authority in American statutory interpretation is a
testament to the durability of its consensus.7
Although Chevron enjoys widespread acceptance today, its pluralist
consensus has been misunderstood and its early promise has not been fully
realized. In 2001, the Supreme Court undermined Chevron’s consensus in
United States v. Mead Corp. by expressly grounding Chevron in the
congressional delegation theory.8 Rather than confine Chevron’s application
to contexts where all the leading rationales support deference to agency
statutory interpretations, the Court held that Chevron applies whenever a court
concludes Congress has authorized an agency to promulgate statutory
interpretations “with the force of law.”9 Predictably, the Court’s turn to
Mead’s delegation fiction has proven to be highly controversial. Proponents of
other rationales for Chevron deference have decried Mead’s delegation inquiry
as an indeterminate legal fiction,10 and circuit courts have struggled to apply

Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233 (1989) [hereinafter Rawls, Domain]. This Article does
not defend Rawls’s vision of liberal political legitimacy per se, nor does it aspire to establish
the political legitimacy of Chevron’s revolution from the perspective of Rawlsian political
liberalism or any other comprehensive theory.
5 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-38 (1996)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING].
6 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839 (1984).
7 Chevron’s consensus differs from Rawls’s paradigmatic “overlapping consensus”
inasmuch as Chevron’s domain is defined by agency decision-making processes rather than
an abstract political conception of the public good. As will be shown in Part II, however,
Chevron also transcends Sunstein’s paradigmatic “incompletely theorized agreement”
because the Supreme Court has implicitly embraced several discrete rationales within
Chevron’s consensus as trans-procedural requirements for Chevron deference. Rather than
attempt to define and defend a third modality of pragmatic consensus in contradistinction to
Rawls and Sunstein, I will simply refer to Chevron’s overlapping rationales throughout this
Article as “Chevron’s consensus.”
8 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
9 Id. at 229.
10 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1475 (2005) [hereinafter Bressman, How Mead Has
Muddled]; Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN.
L. REV. 771, 792 (2002); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2603 (“In Mead and
similar cases, why is the refusal to defer to the executive the most sensible fiction, that is,
the most reasonable instruction to attribute to Congress?”).
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the Supreme Court’s new test in a principled, consistent manner. It might be
tempting to conclude, therefore, that Chevron has drifted far from the moorings
of its original consensus.
Appearances can be deceiving, however. Even after Mead, the Supreme
Court continues to apply Chevron deference only in contexts that fall within
the scope of Chevron’s original consensus. Under the pretext of reconstructing
Congress’s intent, the Court has granted Chevron deference where agency
decision-making processes satisfy five core factors: (1) congressionally
delegated authority, (2) agency expertise, (3) political responsiveness and
accountability, (4) deliberative rationality, and (5) national uniformity.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, none of these overlapping rationales can be
properly considered redundant; since the Court decided Mead, it has
consistently withheld Chevron deference when any one of these core rationales
is not satisfied.11 Thus, the Supreme Court continues to honor Chevron’s
consensus under the veil of Mead’s delegation fiction.
To reap the full benefits of Chevron’s pluralist vision, the Supreme Court
should pierce Mead’s delegation fiction and reaffirm Chevron’s consensus as
the definitive test for determining the scope of Chevron’s domain. By
reconstructing Chevron’s consensus, the Court would defuse much of the
criticism that has been directed against Mead’s polarizing delegation fiction.
More importantly, a consensus-based approach would illuminate the
boundaries of Chevron’s domain, giving circuit courts a more coherent and
intelligible framework for mapping Chevron’s domain. Under the consensusbased approach, federal courts would grant Chevron deference only in contexts
where an agency’s decision-making process satisfies the five leading rationales
for deference. Conversely, where agency statutory interpretations do not
satisfy one or more of these factors, federal courts would bypass Chevron and
consider instead whether deference is warranted under Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.,12 a flexible multifactor test that has resurfaced in Mead’s wake.13
Chevron’s consensus therefore has a vital role to play in clarifying the
respective domains of courts and agencies in statutory interpretation.
I.

CONSTRUCTING CHEVRON’S CONSENSUS

Chevron’s basic facts and holding rank among the most oft-recited in
American law.14 The conventional narrative is familiar territory for students of
administrative law and therefore can be summarized succinctly.

11

See infra Part II.C.
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
13 See id. at 140 (evaluating whether an agency statutory interpretation merits deference
based upon “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
14 See BREYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 289.
12
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In 1977, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to require any company
creating a significant new “stationary source” of air pollutants to undergo an
extensive regulatory review process. Four years later, the EPA interpreted the
term “stationary source” to refer to an emitting plant as a whole rather than the
plant’s constituent parts. This holistic approach to emissions regulation –
known popularly as the “bubble concept” – gave plant management the
flexibility to modify equipment without triggering new source review so long
as the modifications, taken as a whole, did not generate a substantial negative
impact upon the plant’s overall emissions.15 When the Natural Resources
Defense Council appealed the EPA’s new interpretation, the D.C. Circuit
struck down the agency’s rule as an impermissible construction of the Act.16
The Supreme Court disagreed. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice
Stevens, the Court stated that federal courts must apply a two-step test when
reviewing statutes under agency administration: first, if “Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue” and “the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter”; and second, “[i]f . . . the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue” because “the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court must
determine whether the agency’s construction of the statute is reasonable.17
Applying this two-step test to the case at hand, the Court held that the D.C.
Circuit erred in declining to defer to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the
Act.18
Justice Stevens offered several reasons why the D.C. Circuit should have
deferred to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of the term “stationary source.”
First, he explained that the 1977 Amendments could be construed to reflect an
implicit delegation of policymaking authority from Congress to the EPA:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.19
Second, courts should defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutes, Justice Stevens argued, because agencies have experience
and expertise that is valuable in accommodating “manifestly competing
interests” – particularly in contexts where “the regulatory scheme is technical
15

RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 384-85
(4th ed. 2004).
16 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev’d, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
17 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
18 Id. at 844.
19 Id. at 843-44.
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and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”20 Third,
Justice Stevens suggested that administrative agencies might “properly”
resolve the policy questions implicit in ambiguous statutes by “rely[ing] upon
the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to
make such policy choices . . . .”21 Each of these theories – congressional
delegation, agency expertise, and executive accountability – as well as a
variety of others counseled deference to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation of
the Clean Air Act.
A.

The Chevron Revolution: Separating Fact from Fiction

The Chevron decision cast a long shadow over federal statutory
interpretation. Chevron has been hailed “as a kind of revolution[,] . . . not only
as a counter-Marbury for the modern era but also as a kind of McCulloch v.
Maryland, granting the executive broad discretion to choose its own preferred
means to promote statutory ends.”22 Some scholars have argued that Chevron
fundamentally altered the division of labor between courts and agencies in
statutory interpretation.23 Others have viewed Chevron as the starting point for
an even more ambitious project: renegotiating the relationship between courts
and the executive branch across the vast expanse of public law, from criminal
prosecution24 to foreign affairs.25 It may be worth stepping back for a moment,
20

Id. at 865 (citations omitted).
Id.
22 Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2596 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 976 (1992) (“Justice Stevens’s opinion contained several
features that can only be described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if no revolution was intended at
the time.” (citation omitted)).
23 See, e.g., Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2006); John S. Kane, Refining Chevron –
Restoring Judicial Review to Protect Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 532 n.102
(2008).
24 See, e.g., Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that Chevron deference should not be subject to proposed
exceptions for the strict interpretation of criminal and deportation statutes); Dan M. Kahan,
Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 469 (1996).
25 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649, 651 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law,
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1170 (2007) (arguing that the impact of Chevron on executive power
has “many implications for legal issues raised by the war on terror, including those explored
in the Hamdi and Hamdan cases”); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2663-64 (2005). But see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal,
21
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therefore, to distinguish the features of Justice Stevens’s opinion that were
truly revolutionary from those that merely synthesized, well-established
principles.
1.

The Chevron Two-Step

As important as Chevron has become to American statutory interpretation
over the last two decades, in many significant respects its innovations were
more “evolutionary” than “revolutionary.”26 For decades prior to Chevron,
federal courts had preached deference to administrative agencies in statutory
interpretation.
The instruction that courts should honor Congress’s
“unambiguously” expressed intent at Step One followed a long line of
decisions preaching that courts must apply clear statutory instructions.27 By
the same token, Chevron’s assertion that courts should defer to agencies’
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes at Step Two merely clarified
the Court’s prior jurisprudence. For fifty years, the Supreme Court had
stressed that lower courts should defer to agencies where ambiguous statutory
provisions could support multiple plausible constructions.28
This view of Chevron’s two-step formula as a mere synthesis and
refinement of the Supreme Court’s prior jurisprudence has become the
“general consensus” among scholars, and for good reason.29 The opinion itself
does not proclaim any revolutionary purpose, nor does it purport to overrule, or

Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1230 (2007) (disputing
Chevron’s applicability to foreign relations law generally); Evan Criddle, Comment,
Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927-28 (2003)
(disputing Chevron’s applicability to treaty interpretation).
26 Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
284 (1986) (characterizing Chevron as evolutionary since it only “remind[ed] lower federal
courts of their obligation to defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of any statutes
administered by that agency”). See Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58
MO. L. REV. 129, 131 (1993) (arguing that “Chevron’s importance has been exaggerated”).
27 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984);
see, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)
(observing that courts “must reject administrative constructions of the statute . . . that are
inconsistent with the statutory mandate”); Office Employees Int’l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S.
313, 318-19 (1957) (rejecting an agency statutory interpretation based on “the clear
expression of the Congress to the contrary”).
28 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11; Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at
42-43 (inferring from “the absence of a prohibition on the agency arrangements at issue”
and “the lack of a clearly enunciated legislative purpose to that effect” that the FEC’s
statutory interpretation was not “contrary to law”); Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (stating
that the task of interpreting the term “employee” in the National Labor Relations Act “has
been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act” and must
be affirmed “if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law”).
29 Hickman, supra note 23, at 1578.
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even criticize, any earlier case.30 Instead, it emphasizes continuity with prior
decisions and bolsters each step with lengthy string citations to supporting
precedents.31 Chevron’s two-step formula apparently was not a source of
contention among the Justices; no concurring or dissenting opinions
accompanied the decision,32 and the best available evidence suggests that it
was not even discussed during the Court’s internal deliberations.33 Thus, there
is little reason to believe the Supreme Court envisioned Chevron’s two-step
formula as anything more than a modest restatement of the Court’s deference
doctrines.34
2.

Flexible Agency Administration

In another respect, however, Chevron did spark a genuine revolution – by
challenging the reigning principles of certainty and finality in statutory
interpretation. Under certain circumstances, the Court declared, ambiguous
regulatory statutes need not be ascribed a fixed and final meaning, whether by
courts or agencies; rather, their meaning should be allowed to fluctuate over
time to facilitate agency policy experimentation.35 In Chevron’s brave new
world, neither courts nor agencies would have to bind themselves to a
particular interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. Instead, courts
would construe statutory ambiguity as a discretionary space for what I will call
“flexible agency administration” – continuous policy experimentation under
the direction of agency administrators. Here was a revolution, indeed.
In the decades leading up to Chevron, the Supreme Court had deferred to
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes, but only where the
agencies’ interpretations did not conflict with judicial precedent. Once the
Court affirmed an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, that
interpretation became binding on both the agency and the Court on stare

30

See Starr, supra note 26, at 284.
See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
32 Id. at 839.
33 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights
from the Marshall Papers, [1993] 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,606, 10,613
(reviewing Justice Marshall’s private papers and suggesting that the Justices did not focus
on Chevron’s precedential impact upon statutory interpretation generally); see also Merrill
& Hickman, supra note 3, at 838 (explaining that Chevron first achieved prominence in the
lower courts).
34 See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 103 n.6 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is,
of course, of no importance that [an opinion] predates Chevron . . . . As we made clear in
Chevron, the interpretive maxims summarized therein were ‘well-settled principles.’”
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845)); Hickman, supra note 23, at 1578. It should probably
come as no surprise, therefore, that for several subsequent terms the Supreme Court cited
Chevron only irregularly and interchangeably with other precedents.
35 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64 (stating that agencies must consider “varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis”).
31
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decisis grounds.36 Although the Supreme Court deferred to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes in the first instance, it steadfastly
affirmed the principle of judicial supremacy in statutory interpretation by
stressing that courts remain “the final authority on issues of statutory
construction,”37 and by declining to allow agencies to revise their own
statutory interpretations after the interpretations had been etched into judicial
precedents. If an agency wished to adopt a different policy after its prior
statutory interpretation had been adopted by the Supreme Court, its sole
recourse would be an appeal to Congress to revise the statute itself.
Chevron unsettled this status quo by attacking the assumptions on which it
rested – specifically, the traditional understanding that certainty and repose
should trump agency flexibility in administrative law. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Stevens observed that the EPA had “consistently”
interpreted the term “source” in the 1977 Amendments “flexibly – not in a
sterile textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a
technical and complex arena.”38 Justice Stevens reasoned that this flexible
approach to statutory interpretation should prevail over the Court’s traditional
preference for consistency and finality:
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation
of the term “source” does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude
that no deference should be accorded the agency’s interpretation of the
statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.
On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis.39
Traditional concerns for consistency and finality in statutory interpretation
have a weaker claim to authority in this context, the Court suggested, because
the very “definition [of the term ‘source’] itself is flexible, particularly since
Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the
statute.”40 Thus, the EPA could reasonably give “the word ‘source’ . . . a
plantwide definition for some purposes and a narrower definition for other
purposes.”41 Alternatively, the EPA could preliminarily adopt the bubble
concept for plant modifications as its official position but later reverse course
based on a change of policy, perspective, or presidential administration.42 No
longer would the EPA have to bind itself to official positions on questions of
36

See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (stating that
“considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily . . . in statutory construction,” since Congress
may simply modify the statute if they disagree with the Court).
37 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
38 Id. at 863.
39 Id. at 863-64.
40 Id. at 864
41 Id. at 856.
42 Id. at 863-65.
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statutory interpretation that it might later regret with the benefit of a “full
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation.”43
Instead of carving the meaning of statutes in stone, Chevron directed courts to
give agencies the discretion necessary for continuous experimentation,
deliberation, and policy reassessment.
3. Chevron and Stare Decisis
Once the Supreme Court decided in Chevron that agencies should be
permitted to “consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on
a continuing basis”44 rather than commit to a fixed statutory meaning, the
question naturally arose whether courts must relax stare decisis to facilitate
agencies’ flexible statutory interpretation. After all, if flexible agency
administration is preferable to judicial finality in certain contexts, as Chevron
presupposes, why should courts use stare decisis to make agencies commit to
particular interpretations of ambiguous statutes? This question was of central
importance in the Chevron litigation because it had been raised in the
proceedings below and, indeed, was the primary rationale for the D.C.
Circuit’s decision.45
A brief history of the Chevron litigation serves to place the stare decisis
question in context. Throughout the 1970s, the EPA had adopted various
official interpretations of the term “source” in the Clean Air Act
Amendments.46 Of immediate importance to the Chevron litigation was a rule
proposed in 1979 “that would have permitted the use of the ‘bubble concept’
for new installations within a plant as well as for modifications of existing
units.”47 The D.C. Circuit rejected this proposal on statutory interpretation
grounds in two decisions, ASARCO Inc. v. EPA48 and Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle,49 holding that the bubble concept could not be employed in a program
designed to enhance air quality.50 Initially, the EPA complied with the D.C.
Circuit’s decision by promulgating a revised rule that was consistent with the
circuit court’s holding. Soon after President Ronald Reagan took office,
however, the EPA pressed the issue once again, adopting a formal rule in
October 1981 that resurrected the bubble concept for modification of existing

43

Id. at 844.
Id. at 863-64.
45 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(holding the court is “impelled by the force of our precedent” in determining that the
“regulatory change . . . is impermissible”), rev’d, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
46 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855-56.
47 Id. at 855.
48 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
49 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
50 See Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 402; ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 329 (rejecting the bubble
concept as applied to the 1977 Amendments).
44
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units.51 Once again, the D.C. Circuit struck down the EPA’s regulation, this
time relying principally on ASARCO, Alabama Power, and stare decisis.52 As
far as the circuit court was concerned, the legal meaning of the term “source”
in the 1977 Amendments had been resolved conclusively by ASARCO and
Alabama Power and could not be reopened by a new administration’s
unilateral directive.
Had the Supreme Court chosen to do so, it could have ignored the D.C.
Circuit’s stare decisis argument in Chevron. Clearly, the ASARCO and
Alabama Power decisions could not bind the Supreme Court as a matter of
stare decisis. The Court was therefore free to ignore the stare decisis issue that
troubled the D.C. Circuit and examine the underlying question of statutory
interpretation afresh. Given this context, it is noteworthy that the Court
reached out to criticize not only the D.C. Circuit’s failure to defer to the EPA
in ASARCO and Alabama Power, but also the circuit court’s continued reliance
upon these circuit precedents as a matter of stare decisis: “The basic legal error
of the Court of Appeals,” Justice Stevens emphasized, “was to adopt a static
judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that
Congress itself had not commanded that definition.”53 Put simply, the D.C.
Circuit should have resisted the impulse to enforce its own “static” statutory
interpretation via stare decisis rather than honor the EPA’s discretion to
experiment with different reasonable interpretations over time. Chevron thus
challenged the supremacy of stare decisis in statutory interpretation and
offered a new vision of continuous, flexible, agency-directed statutory
administration.
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified and reaffirmed the relationship
between Chevron and stare decisis in National Cable & Telecommunications
Service v. Brand X Internet Services.54 “The whole point of Chevron,” the
Court explained, “is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a
statute with the implementing agency. . . . Chevron’s premise is that it is for
agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.”55 For this reason, “[o]nly a judicial
precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s
51 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981).
52 See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(“This court’s prior adjudications in Alabama Power and ASARCO preclude us from
sanctioning EPA’s employment of the bubble concept in the Clean Air Act’s nonattainment
program.”), rev’d, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
53 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).
54 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (holding that Chevron deference applies to the FCC’s
interpretation of the Communications Act).
55 Id. at 981-82 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)); see also United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Where Chevron
applies, statutory ambiguities remain ambiguities subject to the agency’s ongoing
clarification. They create a space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency
discretion.”).
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interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a
conflicting agency construction.”56
By clarifying what was at stake in Chevron’s vision of flexible agency
administration, Brand X also demonstrated why Chevron was revolutionary
and potentially controversial. For traditionalists, Chevron’s requirement that
courts defer to administrative agencies’ shifting interpretations of ambiguous
statutes on a continuing basis – even in the face of conflicting judicial
interpretations – seemed to sweep aside the core rule-of-law values at the heart
of judicial statutory interpretation.57 Rather than seeking to standardize
statutory meaning, as courts had traditionally done, the Supreme Court in
Chevron and Brand X shunned stare decisis and celebrated interpretive
pluralism, policy flexibility, and a new spirit of regulatory experimentation and
innovation. Where Chevron applied, statutory ambiguities were now “within
the control of the Executive Branch for the future.”58 Even the most
enthusiastic advocates of flexible agency administration recognized the need
for a robust theory to buttress Chevron’s political stability in the midst of
persistent theoretical pluralism.
B.

After the Revolution: Debating Chevron’s Foundation

What that stabilizing theory should look like was less clear. Although
Chevron’s basic canon of deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes quickly gained widespread acceptance across the political spectrum,
scholars disagreed profoundly about precisely why the Supreme Court was
justified in deferring to the EPA’s dynamic interpretation of the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments.
Seeking to stabilize Chevron’s theoretical
underpinnings, commentators proposed grounding Chevron deference in
various comprehensive theories of the administrative state, from constitutional
formalism to deliberative democracy to the unitary executive thesis.59 These
comprehensive theories of the administrative state, in turn, generated
competing rationales for Chevron deference, including implicit congressional
delegation, administrative expertise, the executive branch’s political
accountability for agency policy, agencies’ capacity for rational, transparent
deliberation, and the need for uniformity in statutory administration. Some of
these rationales predated Chevron. Most claimed authority in Chevron’s text.

56

Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83.
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I know of no case, in the entire
history of the federal courts, in which we have allowed a judicial interpretation of a statute
to be set aside by an agency – or have allowed a lower court to render an interpretation of a
statute subject to correction by an agency.”); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941-56 (1992) (arguing that Chevron
undermines the ideal of stability in statutory interpretation); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity,
Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1430 (2005).
58 Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57
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Several surfaced in Chevron’s wake. Each gained adherents in some circles
but was rejected in others. Disagreement persists to this day concerning
Chevron’s optimal theoretical foundation.60
1.

Congressional Delegation

Arguably the leading rationale for Chevron deference is the presumption
that Congress delegates interpretive authority to administrative agencies when
it commits regulatory statutes to agency administration. Although this
“congressional delegation” rationale is often cited as Chevron’s signature
contribution to statutory interpretation,61 the notion that Chevron introduced
this rationale is not entirely accurate. Long before Chevron, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the task of interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions was
“committed”62 or “assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to
administer the Act.”63 In 1974, for example, the Supreme Court explained in
Morton v. Ruiz64 that an agency’s administrative responsibility “necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”65 Chevron provided greater depth to the
congressional delegation thesis, however, by distinguishing “express” from
“implied” delegations and approving both types of delegation as grounds for
deference:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to
an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such
a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory

60

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 23, at 1548 (“The more revolutionary . . . aspect of
Chevron is its call for strong, mandatory deference . . . where Congress implicitly delegates
rulemaking authority through the combination of statutory ambiguity and administrative
responsibility, as exemplified by the Clean Air Act and the EPA.”).
62 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 327 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
63 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
64 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
65 Id. at 231; see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (“[T]he Act
commits [statutory interpretation] in the first instance to the Attorney General and his
delegates, and their construction . . . should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply
because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute.”); Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961)
(citing Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1904)).
61
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provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.66
Put simply, whether or not Congress has expressly authorized an agency to
decide questions of statutory interpretation, courts must construe gaps and
ambiguities in regulatory statutes as implicit delegations of policymaking
authority to administrative agencies.
If the congressional delegation theory was “well-established” and relatively
uncontested before Chevron,67 it has proven to be deeply controversial in
Chevron’s wake. Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit has argued the
assumption “that silence or ambiguity confers that kind of interpretative
authority on the agency is unacceptable, for it assumes the very point in issue
and thus ‘fails to distinguish between statutory ambiguities on the one hand
and legislative delegations of law-interpreting power to agencies on the
other.’”68 The contextual case for a presumption of congressional delegation is
equally tenuous. Congress has never enacted legislation containing a general
delegation of interpretive authority to an administrative agency, and, as
Thomas Merrill has argued, Congress’s general “practice of enacting specific
delegations of interpretative authority suggests that Congress understands that
no such general authority exists.”69 Critics of the congressional delegation
theory have argued persuasively that Congress expressly disclaimed any such
intent to delegate interpretive authority in the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) by directing reviewing courts to “decide all relevant questions of

66 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(citation omitted).
67 Id. at 845; see also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (“It is thus
evident that Congress made a conscious decision to continue its delegation to the Board of
the primary responsibility of marking out the scope of the statutory language and of the
statutory duty to bargain.”).
68 CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of
Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988)). The
congressional delegation theory begs the question, moreover, whether “congressional
intent” is itself a coherent concept. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (“Although Congress has broad
power to decide what kind of judicial review should apply to what kind of administrative
decision, Congress so rarely discloses (or, perhaps, even has) a view on this subject as to
make a search for legislative intent chimerical and a conclusion regarding that intent
fraudulent in the mine run of cases.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real
sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition.”).
69 Merrill, supra note 22, at 995; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells,
538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003) (“[C]ongressional silence often reflects an expectation that courts
will look to the common law to fill gaps in statutory text . . . .”).
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law.”70 When all is said and done, therefore, the best argument for the
congressional delegation theory may rest on legislative inaction; namely, that
Congress has not intervened to suppress Chevron’s revolution.71 But this post
hoc rationale offers, at best, a tenuous justification for flexible agency
administration. Unless Congress speaks more plainly to the issue in the future,
critics’ discontent with the congressional delegation theory is unlikely to
subside.
2.

Agency Expertise

Administrative agencies’ superior experience and expertise in particular
regulatory fields offers a second popular justification for Chevron deference.
Prior to Chevron, courts frequently deferred to agencies based on agencies’
greater familiarity with statutes’ legislative history and congressional intent,
better access to information about the regulated industries or activities, and
practical day-to-day experience administering regulatory statutes.72 Justice
Stephen Breyer has observed that agencies may “have had a hand in drafting”
regulatory statutes, and their staff maintain “close contact with the relevant
legislators and staffs,” giving them insight into “current congressional views,
which, in turn, may, through institutional history, reflect prior
Statutes under agency administration often address
understandings.”73
technical subjects using industry-specific terminology, which agencies are
better equipped to comprehend, contextualize, and apply.74 Because such

70

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in
Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 194-95 (1998) (observing that “commentators in
administrative law have ‘generally acknowledged’ that [the APA] seems to require de novo
review on questions of law”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 865; Panel Discussion,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353,
368 (1987) (comments of Cass Sunstein) (“If there’s any evidence of congressional views in
the meantime, those views are very much in accord with the original spirit of the
Administrative Procedure Act, that is, that administrative agency interpretations of law
should not be deferred to.”).
71 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999) (stating that Congress is
aware that its statutory ambiguities “will be resolved by the implementing agency”).
72 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944); Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
73 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 368 (1986).
74 Starr, supra note 26, at 309-10; see also Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks:
Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 774-75
(1991) (“Once the issue is shifted to one of means, expertise is reflected primarily in the
assessment of the likely outcomes of policy alternatives. Such assessments should be
entitled to deference . . . .”); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 574 (1985) (arguing that “interpretive expertise might be
based on any one of three possible grounds: (1) access to greater knowledge or evidence of
statutory meaning; (2) an interpretive process better suited to yielding correct solutions; or
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statutes are often highly complex, courts rely on agencies’ expertise to
anticipate the effects of the courts’ interpretations on the regulatory scheme as
a whole. Giving deference to agency expertise, courts may then select the
interpretation that will best promote the program’s purpose. For all these
reasons, courts before Chevron deferred to agencies’ expert judgments
regarding the “best” reading of ambiguous statutes.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court marshaled these expertise-based arguments
in support of flexible agency administration. The Court stressed that the Clean
Air Act required the EPA to administer Congress’s “policy decisions in a
technical and complex arena.”75 Although Congress did not decide the policy
issues presented in Chevron “on the level of specificity presented by these
cases,” Congress might have thought “that those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
position to do so.”76 Whether members of Congress actually shared such intent
to delegate this important policy decision to the EPA “matters not,” the Court
reasoned.77 “Judges are not experts in the field” and therefore should allow
agency administrators to administer statutes flexibly based on their relevant
expertise.78
Some scholars have argued vigorously that this expertise theory offers the
best rationale for Chevron deference,79 but the expertise theory has also
attracted criticism. For decades, opponents have argued that “expertise”
cannot be exercised objectively and instead simply masks value-laden policy
decisions.80 Agency expertise may lack traction or take second-billing to
political considerations in contexts where agency policy impacts the
distribution of resources between competing economic interests. Furthermore,
even assuming expertise might be valuable in statutory interpretation
generally, it is not clear that it necessitates Chevron deference. Agency
expertise may be compromised by faulty assumptions or institutional biases.
Sensitive questions of agency statutory interpretation often are committed to

(3) motivation by a set of preferences more conducive to accurate identification of statutory
meaning”).
75 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863, 865
(1984).
76 Id. at 865.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 754.
80 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683-87 (1975); see also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 (2002) (“[T]he legal realists’ hope
that legal ambiguities could be resolved by objective policy expertise has long ago grown
quaint. . . . In practice, it is rare to find a field of social policy where there are not experts
on opposing sides of an issue, . . . undermining any claim to an objective expert
resolution.”).
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political appointees or legal counsel rather than agency specialists.81 In recent
years, the simmering tension between politics and expertise in agency
decision-making has boiled over into the public sphere. Officials at the EPA,
NASA, and the Office of the Surgeon General have criticized the Bush
Administration for discounting, ignoring, or redacting agencies’ expert
findings and recommendations in pursuit of ideological objectives.82 The
Supreme Court itself seems to be growing increasingly concerned about this
systematic neglect and politicization of agency expertise, as Jody Freeman and
Adrian Vermeule have observed.83 To presume that agency statutory
interpretations are based upon expert judgment is to endorse an impressive
legal fiction.
3.

Political Accountability

Another rationale for Chevron deference focuses upon agencies’
relationship with the White House. If questions of statutory interpretation
require sensitive moral judgments or choices between competing interests or
visions of the public good, perhaps these issues should be determined by “the
incumbent administration[]” rather than by the judiciary:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices – resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.84
Since the interpretation of ambiguous statutes under agency administration
“really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, . . . federal judges – who
have no constituency – have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made
by those who do.”85 Unlike the federal judiciary, administrative agencies make
policy under the President’s electoral mandate. The President oversees the
implementation of agency policy and is politically accountable for the success
Thus, questions in statutory
or failure of agency administration.86
81

See HAROLD SEIDMAN, POLITICS, POSITION, AND POWER 58-66 (5th ed. 1998).
See, e.g., Editorial, Censorship on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A1
(describing the EPA’s censorship of a scientific report); Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert
Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1; Jeremy Symons, How
Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B04; Julie Rovner, ExSurgeon General Says Administration Interfered, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, July 10, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11854247.
83 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 92.
84 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
85 Id. at 866.
86 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency NormEntrepreneurship, 115 YALE L.J. 2623, 2626-27 (2006).
82
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interpretation that necessitate “assessing the wisdom of such policy choices
and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are
not judicial ones”; rather, they are committed to “the political branches.”87
This rationale for Chevron deference bears close affinities to unitary executive
theories of the administrative state that seek to anchor all agency policymaking
in the President’s constitutional and popular mandate.88
Several arguments have been leveled against attempts to link Chevron
deference to the executive branch’s political accountability. As Justice Stevens
recognized in Chevron, “agencies are not directly accountable to the people.”89
Nor are individual agency employees – political appointees and career staff –
directly accountable to the people. The legitimacy of an agency’s interpretive
lawmaking under Chevron arguably depends, therefore, upon a theory that all
regulatory policy takes shape under the direction and approval of the Chief
Executive.90 Yet this unitary executive vision of executive lawmaking does
not comport with reality. Although the President exercises general oversight
authority over the federal bureaucracy, Congress has insulated many types of
agency policymaking from direct presidential control by committing these
decisions to independent agencies or administrative law judges,91 and agencies
have been known to repel White House interference in regulatory
policymaking.92 Moreover, as a practical matter, the President cannot
personally review every regulation that might one day lead to litigation.93
Direct presidential policymaking in agency statutory administration is

87

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2005).
89 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
90 Id. at 865. But see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 47, 50-51 (2006) (arguing, contrary to conventional wisdom, that agency
policymaking may be more conducive to transparency and political accountability than
White House policymaking).
91 See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991) (granting authority to the U.S.
Tax Court to construe statutes and rules); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412
(1989) (authorizing the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an independent body
that promulgates binding guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988)
(authorizing the creation of independent counsel to investigate and prosecute “free from
executive supervision”); see also Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 74, at 813 (observing that
the President’s “supervisory power over agencies . . . is largely limited to executive
departmental agencies”).
92 See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 736 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer].
93 See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 90, at 50; Merrill, supra note 22, at 996
(“[I]t is simply unrealistic, given the vastness of the federal bureaucracy, to expect that the
President or his principal lieutenants can effectively monitor the policymaking activities of
all federal agencies.”); Strauss, Overseer, supra note 92, at 754.
88
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exceptional; the vast majority of regulatory decisions that aspire to Chevron
deference cannot be traced neatly to any discrete White House policy directive.
Thus, if Chevron deference is truly based upon a theory that all regulatory
policy emanates from the popularly elected President, Justice Stevens’s
opinion would not be “this generation’s Erie,” as Cass Sunstein has asserted,94
but rather the elevation of a new “brooding omnipresence in the sky”95 for our
generation – the omniscient, omnipotent Chief Executive.
Even assuming that the President could exercise effective control over
agency statutory interpretation, some scholars have argued that presidential
administration alone would not legitimate Chevron deference. For example, an
agency’s responsiveness to political pressures may be a disadvantage if it
forces agencies to disregard their own views as informed by experience and
expertise.96 Lisa Schultz Bressman has argued persuasively that mere political
accountability cannot justify Chevron deference if an agency’s statutory
interpretation is manifestly irrational97 or adopted only informally.98
Moreover, although the President clearly bears responsibility for his or her
administration’s general performance, the degree to which any single agency
statutory interpretation impacts the President’s approval rating may be
negligible. For all these reasons and many more,99 attempts to justify Chevron
based on presidential administration remain controversial.

94

Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2598.
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that
the common law is “not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified”).
96 Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 74, at 814 (demonstrating the tension between
majoritarianism and expertise in agency policymaking); see also Michael Herz, Imposing
Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 249 (1993).
97 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 463-64, 503-15 (2003) (arguing that a
focus on accountability to legitimize agency interpretation “overlooks the ever-present risk
of arbitrariness”).
98 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1449 (“Procedural
formality, whether imposed under constitutional law or administrative law, always has been
a necessary feature of governmental legitimacy.”).
99 See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 284 (2006) (arguing that the White House cannot compel agencies
to adopt a particular statutory interpretation in contexts where Congress has committed the
decision to an agency administrator by express statutory command); Strauss, Overseer,
supra note 92, at 704-05 (“[W]here Congress has assigned a function to a named agency
subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President’s role . . . is that of
overseer and not decider.”).
95
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A variety of other rationales have surfaced post-Chevron to support flexible
agency administration. Peter Strauss has proposed that Chevron be understood
as a device to ensure uniformity in federal administrative law: by committing
ambiguous statutory provisions to executive interpretation, courts reduce the
likelihood that circuit splits will cast a pall of uncertainty over unitary
regulatory programs.100 Cass Sunstein has emphasized the executive’s ability
to react quickly and decisively to “update” statutes in response to changing
circumstances.101 Justice Antonin Scalia, Jack Goldsmith, and John Manning
have gone so far as to suggest the President might have an independent
constitutional power to fill gaps in statutes.102 Other commentators have
stressed the need for deliberative rationality in regulatory policymaking,
arguing that agencies are better at collecting and synthesizing information
through rulemaking processes than are courts through litigation.103 In sum, a
host of theories have sprung up over the past quarter-century to justify
Chevron’s revolution.
C.

Justice Stevens’s Pragmatic Solution

Given these diverse rationales for judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretations, Chevron raised a delicate question: should the Supreme Court
ground flexible agency administration in a theory of congressional delegation,
agency expertise, political responsiveness and accountability, or some other
principle? Had Justice Stevens attempted to ground Chevron’s innovative
deference doctrine in a single foundational theory for flexible agency
administration, his opinion likely would have incited bitter dissents and
concurrences and undermined the decision’s now-iconic status in statutory
interpretation.
The subtle genius of Justice Stevens’s Chevron opinion – and the reason
why it endures as a landmark case in American statutory interpretation today –
is that it unites disparate comprehensive theories into a consensus-based
coalition favoring flexible agency administration. Justice Stevens recognized
that under any of the leading comprehensive rationales for deference to
administrative agencies, the EPA’s decision-making process was sufficiently
100

Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 3, at 1112; see also E. Donald Elliott,
Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and
Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2005).
101 See Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2587-88, 2595.
102 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “a background rule of law against which Congress legislates” is that
“[a]mbiguity means Congress intended agency discretion”); Goldsmith & Manning, supra
note 3, at 2297-2301.
103 See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 469, 484-86 (1986).
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rigorous and the statute under review was sufficiently ambiguous to compel the
conclusion that the questions of statutory interpretation before the Court were
“not judicial ones.”104 By pursuing political harmony and practical wisdom
rather than ideological purity, Chevron cleared a space of relative stability in a
field of law otherwise beset by intractable theoretical conflict. In this respect,
Chevron followed a path marked by political philosopher John Rawls: the
pragmatic “overlapping consensus.”
1.

Rawls’s Overlapping Consensus

A decade before the Supreme Court decided Chevron, Rawls foreshadowed
the decision’s antifoundationalist approach in A Theory of Justice by
introducing the concept of an “overlapping consensus.”105 Rawls’s primary
concern in A Theory of Justice was to defend his vision of “justice as
fairness.”106 In a seminal passage, Rawls argued the diverse members of a
liberal democracy could all embrace “the same principles of justice” despite
“considerable differences in citizens’ conceptions of justice” – whether they be
Kantian, utilitarian, or any other high-level theory – insofar as “these
conceptions lead to similar political judgments.”107 Where “different premises
can yield the same conclusion,” Rawls reasoned, “there exists what we may
refer to as overlapping rather than strict consensus.”108 For Rawls, the
conception of “justice as fairness” was one such overlapping consensus – a
mutually acceptable political conception that could bind together
fundamentally different comprehensive theories of “justice” through
reciprocity. Although reasonable citizens might hold diverse and seemingly
irreconcilable conceptions of the public good, they could also accept “justice
as fairness” as a focal point of overlapping consensus, recognizing that “their
views support the same judgment in the situation at hand, and would do so
even should their respective positions be interchanged.”109
In subsequent writings, Rawls clarified the mechanics and utility of the
overlapping consensus. The primary virtue of an overlapping consensus,
according to Rawls, is that it addresses moral pluralism’s challenge to public
justification in political philosophy.110 Rawls argues that under what he terms
the “liberal principle of legitimacy,” any attempt to prescribe foundational
moral principles for constitutional democracies must accommodate citizens’
heterogeneous religious, philosophical, and moral commitments on their own
terms.111 To elevate a single, comprehensive conception of “justice” to the
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 388.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 388.
See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 15.
Id. at 10, 137; see also Rawls, Domain, supra note 4, at 239.
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detriment of other reasonable conceptions would transform the state into an
intolerably oppressive partisan force in the contest between religious,
philosophical and moral traditions. Instead, constitutional democracy must be
grounded in a shared political conception of justice acceptable to all: the
golden overlapping consensus.112
Rawls’s pragmatic, consensus-based approach to public justification
eschews metaphysics and epistemology in favor of practical reason. Rather
than focus on first principles, Rawls argues that “citizens’ reasoning in the
public forum about constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice . . .
is now best guided by a political conception” of justice, which embodies
“principles and values of which all citizens can endorse.”113 When a true
overlapping consensus is achieved, citizens who advocate competing
comprehensive theories will be able to “endorse the political conception, each
from its own point of view.”114 Each can view the political conception “as
derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other
values.”115
Rawls argues that an overlapping consensus facilitates social harmony and
mutual respect – essential ingredients for political stability in a pluralist
constitutional democracy. To explain how this is so, Rawls contrasts the
overlapping consensus with a modus vivendi or “treaty between two states
whose national aims and interests put them at odds.”116 According to Rawls,
states design treaties to promote their respective national interests. In most
instances, however, “both states are ready to pursue their goals at the expense
of the other, and should conditions change they may do so.”117 Thus, a treaty
built on independent interests is “inevitably fragile,” because it is “founded
solely on self- or group-interest.”118 In contrast, an overlapping consensus is
not merely the “equilibrium point” where competing interests converge, but a
moral conception that unites disparate philosophical and religious traditions.119
Because citizens can view the political conception of “justice as fairness” as a
reflection of their own comprehensive moral doctrines, they “will not withdraw
their support of it should the relative strength of their view in society increase
and eventually become dominant.”120 For Rawls, the generally acceptable

112

See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
6 (1987) [hereinafter Rawls, Overlapping Consensus] (“Given the fact of pluralism, and
given that justification begins from some consensus, no general and comprehensive doctrine
can assume the role of a publicly acceptable basis of political justice.”).
113 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 10.
114 Id. at 134; Rawls, Domain, supra note 4, at 239.
115 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 11.
116 Id. at 147.
117 Id.
118 Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 112, at 2.
119 See id.
120 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 148.
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political abstraction of “fairness” provided a recipe for building consensus,
fostering cooperation and mutual respect, and minimizing antagonism in a
pluralist society divided by diverse moral codes.
2.

Sunstein’s Incompletely Theorized Agreement

While Rawls would build political consensus around an abstract conception
of justice, Cass Sunstein has argued that legal reasoning is often best served by
“incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by
agreements on the narrow or low-level principles that account for them.”121
Put simply, judges may agree about which party should prevail on a legal
claim even if they are unable to arrive at a mutually acceptable high-level
theory to justify that result. For example, three judges on a federal circuit
panel could agree that images alleged to be child pornography are subject to
state regulation without sharing a common definition of pornography or a
comprehensive theory of the First Amendment. Sunstein suggests that in these
circumstances courts might find it useful to avoid grand theory and instead
develop low-level rules that formalize and institutionalize judges’ overlapping
intuitions regarding the appropriate outcome for particular cases.
Sunstein expressly contrasts incompletely theorized agreements with
Rawls’s overlapping consensus. Rawls’s overlapping consensus eschews
comprehensive theories of the public good in favor of abstractions such as
“fairness” that reduce friction and enhance social cohesion. In Rawls’s view,
“the deeper the conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to which we must
ascend to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots.”122 Sunstein takes the
opposite approach. He writes:
The distinctly legal solution to the problem of pluralism is to produce
agreement on particulars, with the thought that often people who are
puzzled by general principles, or who disagree on them, can agree on
individual cases. When we disagree on the relatively abstract, we can
often find agreement by moving to lower levels of generality.123
Whereas Rawls advocates “conceptual ascent” to a higher level of abstraction
as a strategy for defusing political conflict, Sunstein proposes conceptual
descent as a strategy for achieving consensus that he thinks is better suited to
judicial decision-making in a common law system.
Whether based on a high-level abstraction such as “fairness” or the lowlevel particular facts of a given case, the two pragmatic approaches advanced
by Rawls and Sunstein share the same basic aspirations. Both approaches
121 SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 5, at 37; see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely
Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1736 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Agreements] (explaining that when judges “disagree on an abstraction, they move to a level
of greater particularity” to reach a particular outcome).
122 SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 5, at 47 (quoting RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 46).
123 Id.
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harness the overlapping consensus between disparate moral, political, and
jurisprudential traditions. In so doing, both approaches offer a path to political
stability and social cohesion even in the midst of persistent theoretical conflict.
3.

A Consensus for Flexible Agency Administration

Chevron’s defense of flexible agency administration in statutory
construction bears important similarities to both Rawls’s overlapping
consensus and Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreement. The primary
challenge confronting the Court in Chevron was to construct a public
justification for flexible agency statutory administration that would command
the allegiance of reasonable jurists across the political and jurisprudential
spectrum. Given the vast diversity of viewpoints concerning the proper
relationship between courts and agencies in statutory administration, the Court
could not provide a stable public justification for Chevron deference without
addressing the leading comprehensive theories of the administrative process.
If the Court tethered flexible agency administration exclusively to a single
comprehensive theory of the administrative process, it would undermine
Chevron’s political durability and compromise its long-term viability.
Enter Justice Stevens, author of the Supreme Court’s unanimous Chevron
opinion. In recent years, Justice Stevens has gained a reputation as the Roberts
Court’s most vociferous “dissenter,”124 but in an earlier era he was better
known as the Court’s preeminent pragmatist.125 Justice Stevens’s pragmatic
judicial philosophy is illustrated in Burnham v. Superior Court of
California,126 where the Supreme Court considered whether “tag jurisdiction”
would satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.127 In separate
opinions, Justices Scalia and Brennan debated whether a defendant’s actual
physical presence in a forum was sufficient as a matter of law to establish
personal jurisdiction or whether the controlling legal standard was instead
“minimum contacts.”128 Justice White, who shared Justice Stevens’s penchant
for pragmatism, argued that the trial court’s assertion of jurisdiction under such
circumstances had not been shown to be “so arbitrary and lacking in common

124 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2007, at 50, 50,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html.
125 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 240
(1999) (listing Stevens alongside other judicial pragmatists such as Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, White, and Breyer);
Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE 157,
177-79 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003); Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice
Stevens’s Free Speech Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2201 (2006).
126 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
127 Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
128 Compare id. at 607-28 (finding physical presence sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction), with id. at 628-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (proposing
“minimum contacts” as the appropriate standard).
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sense” as to necessitate reversal.129 Justice Stevens, for his part, declined to
take sides in the debate among these three approaches. Instead, he filed a short
concurring opinion stating that “it is sufficient to note that the historical
evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of
fairness identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by
Justice White, all combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy
case.”130 If all nine Justices could agree that the Fourteenth Amendment
permitted tag jurisdiction according to their own jurisprudential theories, the
Court need not decide whether Justice Scalia’s originalist theory, Justice
Brennan’s teleological/evolutionary theory, or some other comprehensive
theory best defined the demands of constitutional due process.
In the Supreme Court’s unanimous Chevron opinion, Justice Stevens
employed a similar consensus-based justification for flexible agency
administration. Foreshadowing Burnham, Justice Stevens refrained from
taking sides in the debate between unitary executive theory, public choice
theory, civic republicanism, and other comprehensive theories of the
administrative process. Instead, Justice Stevens spoke approvingly of each of
these theories, arguing there were multiple overlapping justifications for
Chevron deference, including implicit congressional delegation,131 agency
expertise,132 presidential accountability,133 and inherent executive authority.134
In this manner, Chevron laid the foundation for a pragmatic consensus in
statutory interpretation: when an administrative agency engages in flexible
statutory interpretation through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures,
citizens of diverse religious, philosophical, and moral perspectives could agree
that courts ought to defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions.
Justice Stevens’s effort to integrate multiple overlapping rationales for
flexible agency administration was critical to establishing Chevron’s political
stability. As discussed previously, Chevron sparked a quiet revolution in
statutory interpretation by holding that regulatory statutes need not be set in
stone, thereby allowing agencies to define ambiguous statutory provisions
flexibly, subject only to the spare constraints of reasonableness. This
129

Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
131 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984) (stating that “express delegation” exists when Congress “explicitly le[aves] a gap for
the agency to fill”).
132 See id. at 844, 865 (remarking that Congress gave deference to agencies because
“those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision”
would be better able to do so than Congress).
133 See id. at 865 (indicating that the President’s direct accountability to the people makes
it appropriate for the executive branch – including administrative agencies – to make policy
decisions).
134 See id. at 845 (arguing that “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer”).
130
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unprecedented endorsement of flexible agency interpretation necessitated a
robust political justification, one that would foster stability and mutual respect
in a pluralist legal community.
Lacking a unifying “political conception” of flexible agency administration
akin to Rawls’s vision of “justice as fairness,” Justice Stevens instead
grounded Chevron’s consensus in attributes of the EPA’s decision-making
process. The agency activities under review in Chevron sat serendipitously at
the crossroads of the leading comprehensive theories of administrative
governance: the Clean Air Act’s “regulatory scheme [was] technical and
complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,
and the decision involve[d] reconciling conflicting policies.”135 How best to
vindicate industry emission standards without unduly retarding industry
productivity was a sensitive policy question that rested squarely within the
agency’s expertise. The EPA had adopted the bubble concept through noticeand-comment rulemaking, which allowed for public participation and reasoned
deliberation. In addition, the EPA’s return to the bubble concept in 1981
followed a change in presidential administrations, suggesting that the EPA had,
in fact, “rel[ied] upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to
inform its judgments.”136 Finally, to the extent the Court explored Congress’s
intent, Stevens’s opinion hypothesized a variety of plausible explanations for
why Congress might have chosen to delegate authority to the EPA under the
circumstances.137 Embracing all these rationales for deference as equally
valid, the Supreme Court endorsed the EPA’s decision-making process in
Chevron as the focal point for a consensus favoring flexible agency
administration.
As applied to traditional agency rulemakings like the EPA’s bubble rule,
Chevron’s consensus-based justification for flexible agency administration has
proven to be remarkably durable for nearly a quarter-century. Judges,
litigators, and academics of diverse political and jurisprudential commitments
have embraced Chevron, each defending the decision as an expression of their
otherwise discordant visions of the administrative state.138 Legislative
supremacists defend Chevron’s implied congressional delegation thesis as a
principled reconstruction of Congress’s intent.139 Legal realists, for their part,
generally reject the congressional delegation thesis but emphasize functional

135

Id. at 865.
Id.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 73, at 368; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517; Panel Discussion, supra
note 70.
139 See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (“Congress, when it left
ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency
(rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”).
136
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concerns such as the comparative advantages of agency expertise, uniformity,
and dispatch.140 For advocates of a unitary executive model of the
administrative state, Chevron seems to reinforce presidential primacy in
regulatory policy.141 Chevron’s account of agencies relying on the current
administration’s political priorities when “reconciling conflicting policies”
likewise resonates for public choice theorists.142 Neopluralists and civic
republicans emphasize the comparative advantages of agency deliberative
procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking as a forum for public
engagement and consensus-building in agency norm-entrepreneurship.143
Justice Stevens’s polyphonic Chevron opinion thus speaks to readers in the
language of their own comprehensive theories.
Jurists with diverse
perspectives have hailed the decision as an affirmation of their own disparate
visions of the administrative state.
Chevron’s revolution has encountered resistance along the way, of course.
In the years immediately following the decision, some scholars argued that
flexible agency administration shifted the balance of power in statutory
interpretation too far in the direction of executive discretion, inappropriately
diminishing the judiciary’s traditional role.144 Such criticism was relatively
thin during Chevron’s infancy, however, and it has only diminished with the
passage of time. To be sure, critics might yet argue that none of Chevron’s
interwoven rationales for deference – including the consensus construct itself –
suffices to legitimate Chevron as a matter of legal or political theory. As a
practical matter, however, the Chevron revolution is a fait accompli. If
Chevron has not achieved perfect consensus outside of the Supreme Court, the
breadth of its appeal and the strength of its precedential authority among
judges, academics, and practitioners of diverse views is nothing short of
remarkable.

140 See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Justice of Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive
Claims of Independent Authority To Interpret the Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157,
158-59 (2005) (describing “the legal realist view that assigning legal meaning is a choice of
policy” as the “dominant paradigm” since Chevron); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note
3, at 2583 (characterizing Chevron as “a natural and proper outgrowth of . . . the legal realist
attack on the autonomy of legal reasoning”).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256-57 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Chevron rests, at least in part, on the executive’s inherent
lawmaking authority); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 3, at 2297-2301.
142 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382
(1961)).
143 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 138 (advocating a deliberative democracy
conception of Chevron that requires an agency to “persuasively explain its interpretation” to
the public).
144 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) (expressing separation-of-powers
concerns); Shapiro, supra note 57, at 941-56; Tyler, supra note 57, at 1430.
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DECONSTRUCTING DELEGATION

Justice Stevens’s singular achievement in Chevron was to construct a
consensus in favor of flexible agency administration in contexts where
agencies use notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to interpret
ambiguous statutory provisions. This pragmatic consensus earned Chevron
widespread renown, but it also left a host of important questions unanswered.
For example, did the Court in Chevron necessarily adopt all of the competing
comprehensive rationales for deference? If so, what should courts do when
these rationales point in different directions? Would Chevron command
deference if agency administrators follow presidential directives but refuse to
employ deliberative decision-making processes or disregard the expert
opinions of career staff? Would Chevron apply equally to legislative rules,
interpretive rules, opinion letters, internal agency guidelines, informal policy
statements, and agency litigation positions? If not, where should courts draw
the line between agency actions that fall within Chevron’s domain and those
that do not?
These questions illustrate a problem of central importance to Chevron’s
legacy, characterized in recent commentary as “Step Zero,”145 namely: to what
forms of agency action does Chevron apply? Since 2001, the Supreme Court
has attempted to address this problem by endorsing congressional delegation as
the definitive test for Chevron deference.146 This approach has appeased some
critics, irritated others, and perplexed the circuit courts. Beneath the Supreme
Court’s delegation rhetoric, however, the Court has continued to honor
Chevron’s pragmatic spirit by granting Chevron deference only when agency
decision-making processes satisfy five core rationales: congressional
delegation, agency expertise, political responsiveness and accountability,
deliberative rationality, and national uniformity.
A.

The Unbearable Lightness of Congressional Delegation

For roughly a decade and a half after Chevron, the prevailing assumption
among circuit courts and scholars was that the decision represented an
“incompletely theorized agreement”147 that would require further clarification
and refinement. Many expected that the Supreme Court eventually would have
to choose between the competing comprehensive rationales for Chevron
deference.148 Law reviews overflowed with commentary on Chevron as
145

See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 224-26 (2006).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-32 (denying Chevron deference where there is no
congressional delegation of authority to the agency).
147 See generally Sunstein, Agreements, supra note 121 (discussing the mechanics of
incompletely theorized agreements in other settings).
148 See Hickman, supra note 23, at 1550 (“Scholars posited a variety of legal foundations
for Chevron including not only congressional delegation but others ranging from
constitutional requirement to mere judicial policy. Changing Chevron’s underlying premise
alters the scope of the doctrine’s applicability.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to
146
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scholars advocated first one and then another foundational theory. Neglecting
the strength and stability of Chevron’s original consensus, proponents of
various legal and political theories encouraged the Supreme Court to cut
through the Gordian knot of Chevron’s interwoven rationales and anoint their
particular theory as Chevron’s authoritative foundation.149
The Supreme Court took the bait in United States v. Mead Corp.150 In an
opinion authored by Justice David Souter, the Court denied Chevron deference
to the U.S. Customs Service’s tariff classification rulings because there was
“no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of
law.”151 The Court explained that flexible agency administration under
Chevron did not extend to all agency interpretive choices: “[A]gencies charged
with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices,
and . . . not all of those choices bind judges to follow them . . . .”152 Instead,
Chevron deference applied to a limited “category of interpretive choices
distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference.”153 That
additional reason, the Court explained, was congressional delegation:
This Court in Chevron recognized that Congress not only engages in
express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that
“[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit.” Congress, that is, may not have expressly delegated
authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a
particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally
conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress
would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it
addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even
one about which “Congress did not actually have an intent” as to a
particular result.154
By characterizing congressional delegation as the definitive test for Chevron
deference, Mead limited Chevron’s scope to fields of administrative activity in

Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997, 1005 (2007) (commenting
that the “different explanations for deference” in Chevron prompted scholars “to debate
Chevron’s legal underpinnings”).
149 See supra Part I.B.
150 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
151 Id. at 221.
152 Id. at 227.
153 Id. at 229. Justice Breyer paved the way for this “additional reason” theory a year
earlier when he argued in an influential dissent that Chevron “simply focused upon an
additional, separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations, namely, that
Congress had delegated to the agency the legal authority to make those determinations.”
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 3, at 872, noted in Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.11.
154 Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984)).
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which courts could reasonably infer that Congress would have intended to give
agencies the authority to act with “the force of law.”155 Outside this limited
domain, an agency might still receive deference under the Supreme Court’s
pre-Chevron interpretive principles, as outlined in the 1944 decision Skidmore
v. Swift & Co.,156 based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”157 However, outside Chevron’s domain, agencies would lack the
same freedom to change course and experiment with different interpretations
of ambiguous statutes.
Since the Supreme Court decided Mead, circuit courts have construed the
decision to mean that reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes
receive Chevron deference “as long as Congress has delegated to agencies the
power to make policy by interpreting ambiguous statutory language or filling
gaps in regulatory laws.”158 Scholars have characterized the congressional
delegation theory as the Supreme Court’s new “consensus view.”159 Thus,
congressional delegation has been elevated rhetorically as the single, definitive
test for Chevron deference, neglecting other comprehensive rationales for
flexible agency administration.
As one would expect, critics of the congressional delegation theory have
greeted this development with consternation and disdain. Shortly after the
Supreme Court decided Mead, Ronald Krotoszynski decried the delegation
theory as a “bad farce” that would yield insupportable results; an agency
decision based upon public deliberation and expertise – but without implied
delegation – would not qualify for Chevron deference, while agency policies
adopted with no deliberation and contrary to expert judgment would qualify.160
More troubling still were concerns that the congressional delegation theory
was an emperor with no clothes. As discussed previously, the evidentiary
record supporting Chevron’s presumption that Congress intends to give
agencies law-interpretive authority is perilously thin,161 leading many
155

See id. at 226-27.
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
157 Id. at 140, quoted in Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
158 Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2637 (2003); see
also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006) (emphasizing the congressional
delegation inquiry).
159 Garrett, supra note 158, at 2637.
160 Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 753.
161 See Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 3, at 2590 (arguing that when
congressional delegation is “explored on a case-by-case basis, . . . it is likely that courts will
be unable to find any clear expression of congressional will to that effect”). The Chevron
decision itself expressed skepticism in drawing inferences about congressional intent from
statutory text. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
861 (1984) (“We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute
will reveal an actual intent of Congress.”).
156
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commentators to characterize the theory as a “legal fiction.”162 For some
scholars, the very fact that congressional delegation was a “legal fiction” at all
was a sufficiently grievous sin to justify abandoning Mead on principle.163
Others raised more mundane concerns: as a legal fiction, the congressional
delegation standard was simply too incoherent, too amorphous, and too
indeterminate in practice to guide courts in defining Chevron’s reach.164 Far
from quelling confusion regarding Chevron’s theoretical underpinnings, the
Supreme Court’s delegation fiction simply deepened lower courts’ uncertainty
about Chevron’s scope.
B.

Mead’s Veiled Consensus

Taken at face value, the Supreme Court’s embrace of Mead’s delegation
fiction could be construed as an abandonment of Chevron’s consensus. As
with any legal fiction, however, the impact of Mead’s delegation trope cannot
be evaluated adequately without taking into account the ends to which it has
been employed in practice. Over a century ago, an article in the Harvard Law
Review observed that legal fictions “may appear not merely absurd, but
positively unjust and wrongful.”165 However, when viewed “in their proper
relations[,] noting their cause and effect[,] the people among whom and the
conditions under which they flourished[] – the absurdity and injustice may
perhaps disappear.”166 So it is with Mead’s delegation fiction: on a superficial
level, Mead appears to abandon Chevron’s pluralist consensus in favor of an
unprincipled, unpredictable case-by-case analysis. Dig deeper, however, and it
becomes apparent that the Supreme Court actually employs Mead’s delegation
fiction strategically to reach outcomes consistent with Chevron’s consensusbased approach.
In the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, Chevron’s domain has been
circumscribed by five core rationales. As explained in Part I, agency statutory
162 See, e.g., Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing
the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1212 (1990).
163 See, e.g., Steven Croley, The Applicability of the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO
JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 103, 115 (John F. Duffy & Michael
Herz eds., 2005) (arguing that Mead compounds the delegation fiction by construing noticeand-comment procedures as evidence of congressional intent); Sunstein, Beyond Marbury,
supra note 3, at 2589-94.
164 See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1448 (arguing that
Mead’s rationale has spawned uncertainty and confusion); Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at
751 (arguing that the congressional delegation’s fictional character makes it too easy for
courts to infer delegation depending on how they want to decide a given case); Ronald M.
Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 772, 782
(2002) (criticizing Mead for endorsing a “daunting set of abstractions” and arguing that the
Chevron/Skidmore distinction has “no functional justification”).
165 Oliver R. Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or Detrimental
to Its Growth?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 249, 251 (1893).
166 Id.

2008]

CHEVRON’S CONSENSUS

1303

interpretations qualify for Chevron deference when the agency (1) exercises
delegated lawmaking authority; (2) respects expert judgment; (3) reflects
political responsiveness and accountability; (4) promotes deliberative
rationality; and (5) facilitates national uniformity. Although the Supreme
Court generally presumes as a preliminary matter that agency statutory
interpretations qualify for Chevron deference, litigants may rebut this
presumption by demonstrating that one or more of the five rationales remains
unsatisfied. If an agency’s policymaking process fails to satisfy a core
constituency of Chevron’s consensus, the Supreme Court declines to apply
Chevron’s two-step test, citing concerns that Congress could not have intended
to delegate interpretive authority under the circumstances. Thus, the Supreme
Court applies Chevron deference only in contexts where agency decisionmaking processes support a robust consensus.
The Mead decision itself reflects the continuing relevance of Chevron’s
consensus. At the outset of the majority opinion, Justice Souter took pains to
distinguish Chevron as a distinct “category of interpretive choices,” which
involved not only agency expertise, presidential influence, formality, and
deliberation – the traditional Skidmore factors – but also the crucial
“additional” ingredient of congressionally delegated lawmaking authority.167
Having drawn this distinction between Chevron and Skidmore, however,
Justice Souter immediately proceeded to deconstruct the delegation theory by
considering all of the Skidmore factors under the pretense of looking for
congressional intent. One “very good indicator of delegation,” Souter
reasoned, would be “express congressional authorizations to engage in . . .
relatively formal administrative procedure” such as “rulemaking or
adjudication that . . . tend[s] to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force.”168 Souter noted further that tariff
classification letters were not ordinarily approved by the Commissioner of
Customs or the Secretary of the Treasury (much less the White House) prior to
issuance and thus did not bear the hallmarks of political responsiveness or
accountability.169 In addition, tariff classification letters could not reasonably
be construed as an instrument for setting uniform national policy, Souter
suggested, because the Custom Service’s forty-six offices around the country
promulgated roughly 10,000 to 15,000 letters during the same year,170 and all
such letters were subject to de novo review by the Court of International
Trade.171

167

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-29 (2001).
Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added); see also id. at 231 n.13.
169 Id. at 238 n.19; cf. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2006) (deferring
to a Coast Guard determination that particular vessels represented a “high risk” of terrorist
attack because the relevant security plan was “approved at a national level by the Coast
Guard Commandant”).
170 Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
171 Id. at 232-33.
168
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For each of these reasons, the Court declined to infer delegation from the
Customs Service’s statutory authority to “fix the final classification and rate”
for tariff classifications.172 Instead, the Court looked beyond the mere
delegation of lawmaking authority to the formality of the agency’s decision,
whether the rule represented administration policy, and the degree of care and
deliberation required in the decision-making process.173 Because the customs
letter did not satisfy these factors crucial to Chevron’s consensus, Justice
Souter and seven other Justices concluded the evidence of congressional
delegation was insufficient.174
Although Mead formally endorsed the congressional delegation theory as
the definitive test for Chevron deference, the Supreme Court actually
employed Mead’s delegation fiction primarily as a heuristic for highlighting
the concerns that a reasonable legislator might consider when deciding whether
to delegate interpretive authority to an administrative agency. Because
reasonable legislators of diverse perspectives might very well choose to
condition Chevron deference on agency deliberation, applied expertise,
political responsiveness, or other leading rationales, the Court must likewise
consider these factors at Step Zero. If any of the leading comprehensive
theories for flexible agency administration remained unsatisfied, the Court
could not be confident that Congress would have delegated interpretive
authority to the Customs Service under the circumstances presented in Mead.
Thus framed, Mead’s delegation fiction simply directed the Supreme Court
back to Chevron’s original consensus.
That the Mead majority employed the delegation fiction as a heuristic for
considering multiple rationales for deference was not lost on the Court’s lone
dissenter, Justice Scalia. The majority’s multifactor inquiry was unacceptable,
he argued, because Chevron rested on one, and only one, consideration: “[A]
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved . . . by the agency . . . .”175 In characteristically colorful prose, Justice
172

Id. at 222 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1500(b) (2000)).
Id. at 230.
174 Id. at 231-32.
175 Id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In fairness to Justice Scalia, many of the
Supreme Court’s pre-Mead decisions did treat statutory gaps as prima facie evidence of
congressional delegation. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988)
(holding that “a reviewing court must give deference” to a reasonable agency interpretation
of a statute where Congress “is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue”). On
the other hand, the Court had also withheld deference in other cases where it found “reason
to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation.” FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). For example, the Court
declined to defer to: agency litigation positions, see, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988); interpretations raising “serious constitutional
concerns,” see, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
173
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Scalia condemned the majority’s rejection of this simple delegation
presumption for “th’ol ‘totality of the circumstances’ test” as an “avulsive
change in judicial review of federal administrative action.”176 Justice Scalia
mocked the majority’s concern for the lack of formality in Customs Service
letters, noting that “[t]here is no necessary connection between the formality of
procedure and the power of the entity administering the procedure to resolve
authoritatively questions of law.”177 More generally, he belittled “the utter
flabbiness” of the majority’s approach, which incorporated “a grab bag of
other factors – including [but not limited to] the factor that used to be the sole
criterion for Chevron deference: whether the interpretation represented the
authoritative position of the agency.”178 The majority’s consideration of “the
multifarious ways in which congressional intent can be manifested” would
only lead to debilitating uncertainty in the lower federal courts, Justice Scalia
prophesied.179
The last six years have witnessed the fulfillment of Justice Scalia’s
prophecy. Indeed, federal circuit courts have struggled mightily to apply
Mead’s multifactor test in a principled fashion, assuming (as did Justice Scalia)
that delegation must now be determined by juggling a grab bag of disparate
concerns.180 What these courts and Mead’s critics have failed to appreciate is
that Justice Souter’s multifactor analysis was never intended to operate as a
flexible balancing test. Contrary to Justice Scalia’s characterization, the Mead
majority did not attempt to ascertain whether the preponderance of evidence
before the Court raised an inference of delegation. Instead, Mead held tariff
classification rulings to a higher standard. Chevron did not apply, the majority
held, because the Customs Service’s procedures for promulgating tariff
classification letters did not satisfy several essential criteria.181 Unlike the
notice-and-comment procedures in Chevron, the Customs Service’s decisionmaking procedures were not conducive to open public deliberation, lacked
precedential authority, and did not require the Superintendent’s
contemporaneous approval.182 For each of these three independent reasons, the
531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001), and Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); and so-called “major questions” that
Congress would be unlikely to delegate to agency policymakers, see, e.g., Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986)).
176 Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 243.
178 Id. at 245.
179 Id. at 251.
180 See, e.g., United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Following Mead, the continuum of agency deference has been fraught with ambiguity.”);
Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
Mead has “further obscured the already murky administrative law surrounding Chevron”).
181 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
182 See id. at 231-33.
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tariff classification rulings could not support a consensus for flexible agency
administration. The Supreme Court applied Mead’s delegation fiction in a
manner that preserved the domain of Chevron’s consensus.
C.

Piercing Mead’s Delegation Fiction

In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has continued to apply Chevron’s
pragmatic consensus under the veil of Mead’s delegation fiction. During the
period from June 2001 – when Mead was decided – through the end of
December 2007, the Supreme Court cited Chevron or Mead in forty-three
cases.183 The Court explicitly applied Step Zero analysis – evaluating whether
an agency action fell within Chevron’s domain – in fourteen of the cases.184
While critics might quibble with the results reached in these fourteen cases, the
Court’s explanations for granting or withholding Chevron deference therein is
facially consistent with the consensus thesis advanced in this Article. Another
six cases apply Chevron or Skidmore without expressly addressing the Step
Zero question.185 In seven cases, the Court denied Chevron deference based on

183

These forty-three cases were identified through a search of the Westlaw database in
January 2008.
184 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350-51 (2007)
(granting Chevron deference); Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc. v. Metrophones
Telecomm., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513, 1520 (2007) (granting Chevron deference based on
congressional delegation); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534,
1540-41 (2007) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation and expertise); Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-69 (2006) (denying Chevron deference based on lack of
delegation and expertise); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 980-86 (2005) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation); Household
Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238-39 (2004) (granting Chevron deference based
on delegation); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487-88 (2004)
(denying Chevron deference to internal guidance memoranda since it “lack[s] the force of
law”); Wash. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 383 n.6 (2003)
(denying Chevron deference to a Social Security Administration internal manual since it
was not “a product[] of formal rulemaking); Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U.S. 36,
45 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11 n.6 (2002) (denying Chevron deference to EEOC compliance
manual due to poor agency deliberative process); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S.
467, 501-02 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on delegation and expertise);
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002) (granting Chevron deference based on
expertise and deliberative rationality); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S.
137, 151 n.5 (2002) (denying Chevron deference based, in part, on lack of agency
deliberation); Wis. Dep’t of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 497 (2002)
(granting only Skidmore deference to proposed Medicaid rule despite finding both
congressional delegation and administrative expertise).
185 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534
(2007); Raymond B. Yates Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004);
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-26 (2003); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20
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perceived statutory clarity at Step One without addressing Step Zero.186 The
remaining sixteen cases are inconclusive; the Court either sidestepped Chevron
entirely or cited Chevron or Mead without considering the scope of Chevron’s
domain.187
The precedential impact of Mead’s delegation fiction is probably best
assessed by examining the fourteen cases in which the Supreme Court
expressly addressed the scope of Chevron’s domain. Collectively, these
decisions strongly support the Chevron/Mead five-factor consensus: where
agency decision-making processes arguably satisfied all five rationales at the
core of Chevron’s consensus – delegated authority, expertise, political
accountability, deliberative rationality, and national uniformity – the Court
applied Chevron’s two-step formula. On the other hand, where any one of
these five rationales for deference was demonstrably lacking, the Court
withheld Chevron treatment.
To be sure, in the years following Mead the Court has steadfastly
characterized congressional delegation as the crucial factor that distinguishes
Chevron’s domain from Skidmore,188 and the Court appears to take seriously
its commitment to honor Congress’s intent. At the same time, however, the
Court routinely reaches beyond statutory text, legislative history, and
“traditional tools of statutory construction”189 to consider evidence of agency
expertise, political accountability, deliberative rationality, and national

(2002); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18-20 (2002); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 333 (2002).
186 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460 n.26 (2007); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006); Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 287-88 (2003); Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002); Ragsdale v. Wolverine World
Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2002); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. 534 U.S. 438, 462
(2002); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320-21 n.45 (2001).
187 See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2781
n.18 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.
Ct. 2499, 2515 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 127 S. Ct. 1559,
1584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1423,
1428 (2007); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 70 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Smith v.
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243-47, 264-67 (2005); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241,
269 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.
581, 600 (2004); Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003); Nat’l
Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 809 (2003); Pharm. Research
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 680-81 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Utah v.
Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 472 (2002); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazbal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002);
Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002); Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv.
Plan v. Matz, 533 U.S. 925, 925 (2001).
188 See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258.
189 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
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uniformity. In so doing, the Court has surreptitiously breathed new life into
Chevron’s consensus.
1.

Barnhart v. Walton

One vivid illustration of this trend is Barnhart v. Walton,190 the Supreme
Court’s 2002 decision upholding the Social Security Administration’s
interpretation of the statutory definition of “disability” under the Social
Security Act (“SSA”) as requiring that a claimant’s “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity” last for at least twelve months.191 Preliminarily,
the Court acknowledged that the Agency had formulated its interpretation of
the SSA “through means less formal than ‘notice and comment rulemaking’”
but concluded that this would not necessarily disqualify the interpretation from
Chevron deference because, under Mead, less formal decision-making
processes might also qualify for deference.192 After Mead, Chevron deference
would apply when supported by a robust consensus. The Court explained:
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that
Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the
legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.193
Because all these overlapping rationales favored deference, the Court applied
Chevron deference and upheld the Social Security Administration’s reasonable
statutory interpretation.194
2.

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke

More recently, the Supreme Court employed a similar consensus-based
approach to Chevron Step One in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke.195
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court considered a
Department of Labor regulation exempting domestic workers who provide
“companionship services” to the elderly and infirm from the Fair Labor
Standards Act’s minimum wage and overtime wage requirements. At the
outset, Justice Breyer affirmed Mead’s delegation fiction by echoing
Chevron’s insight that the “power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of

190

535 U.S. 212 (2002).
Id. at 214 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000)).
192 Id. at 221-22.
193 Id. at 222 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001); 1
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 1.7, 3.3
(3d ed. 1994)).
194 Id. at 215.
195 127 S. Ct. 2339 (2007).
191
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policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Observing that the Agency’s regulation addressed “an
Congress.”196
interstitial matter,”197 the Court concluded that Congress had “entrusted the
agency to work out”198 the details through flexible agency administration: “[I]t
is . . . reasonable to infer (and we do infer) that Congress intended its broad
grant of definitional authority to the Department to include the authority to
answer these kinds of questions.”199
The Court’s Step Zero analysis did not rely exclusively upon this textual
delegation analysis, however. As in Barnhart, the Court considered a variety
of other rationales for Chevron deference under the veil of Mead’s delegation
fiction. The Court stressed, for example, that “[t]he subject matter of the
regulation in question concerns a matter in respect to which the agency is
expert.”200 In addition, the Court observed that the Agency had adopted the
regulation through a robust deliberative process: “The Department focused
fully upon the matter in question. It gave notice, it proposed regulations, it
received public comment, and it issued final regulations in light of that
comment.”201 Although the Court concluded by asserting that “the ultimate
question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to
treat an agency’s rule . . . as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency,”
the Court emphasized that this inquiry required consideration of a variety of
factors.202 These factors included whether “the agency focuses fully and
directly upon the issue” as through “full notice-and-comment procedures” –
not simply whether “the resulting rule falls within the [agency’s] statutory
grant of authority.”203
3.

Gonzales v. Oregon

The Court employed a similar consensus-based analysis in Gonzales v.
Oregon204 when it rejected Attorney General John Ashcroft’s interpretive rule
declaring physician-assisted suicide a violation of the Controlled Substances
Act (“CSA”).205 Like Barnhart and Long Island Care, Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s opinion for a six-Justice majority invoked Mead’s delegation
fiction as the authoritative test for determining whether the Attorney General’s

196
Id. at 2345 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197 Id. at 2346.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 2347.
200 Id. at 2346.
201 Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)).
202 Id. at 2350.
203 Id.
204 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
205 Id. at 268.
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interpretation warranted Chevron deference.206 In the majority’s view, the
CSA’s text and structure did not support the assertion that Congress intended
to authorize the Attorney General to declare physician-assisted suicide “outside
‘the course of professional practice,’ and therefore a criminal violation of the
CSA.”207 But Justice Kennedy’s Chevron analysis did not end there. Looking
beyond the statutory text and structure, he also took pains to address other
factors from Chevron’s consensus that Congress might have considered
important. He stressed, for example, that Attorney General Ashcroft issued the
interpretive rule “without consulting Oregon or apparently anyone outside his
Department.”208 Therefore, the interpretive rule could not be attributed to a
presidential directive or deliberative-democratic process. Moreover, Justice
Kennedy reasoned that the Attorney General’s lack of experience and expertise
were important factors in discerning congressional delegation (or the lack
thereof), “[b]ecause historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account
in the first instance for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive
lawmaking power to [an] agency.”209 The Attorney General’s relative lack of
experience and expertise in matters of medical ethics militated “against a
conclusion that the Attorney General ha[d] authority to make quintessentially
medical judgments” relating to physician-assisted suicide.210 Once again,
Mead’s delegation fiction invited the Court to address multiple comprehensive
rationales for Chevron deference under the pretext of searching for evidence of
congressional intent.
4.

Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer

If the Supreme Court only invoked considerations such as agency expertise,
deliberation, and political responsiveness as supplemental support for
conclusions predetermined by the congressional delegation theory, it might be
reasonable to conclude that Mead’s delegation theory controls Step Zero while
other rationales for Chevron deference are mere window dressing. The Court’s
decision in Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer211
challenges this hypothesis.

206

Id. at 255-56, 259.
Id. at 262-63 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 744
(1973)).
208 Id. at 253-54.
209 Id. at 266-67 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n,
499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991)).
210 Id. at 267; cf. Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469-71 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Jody
Freeman and Adrian Vermeule have argued that Gonzales and other recent Supreme Court
decisions reflect a movement away from a political accountability model and toward a
renewed focus on agency expertise. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 83, at 54. More
accurately, perhaps, Gonzales and other recent cases suggest that both rationales must be
satisfied to trigger Chevron deference.
211 534 U.S. 473 (2002).
207
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At issue in Blumer was whether the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988 (“MCCA”) would permit states to use an “income-first” method for
calculating resource allowances for a person living at home after their spouse
had been institutionalized, and thereby become eligible for Medicaid.212 Over
the preceding decade, the Secretary of Health and Human Services had
weighed in on the issue several times, issuing formal statements in favor of the
income-first method.213 By 2001, the Secretary had announced a proposed rule
that would permit states to make “the threshold choice of using either the
income-first or [an alternative] method.”214 Wisconsin resident Irene Blumer
challenged her state’s adoption of the “income-first” method and, indirectly,
the Secretary’s interpretation of the MCCA, seeking expedited access to
Medicaid funds.215
On review, the Supreme Court held that Congress had delegated to the
Secretary “the authority to prescribe standards relevant to the issue”216 and that
the Secretary had exercised that authority by promulgating a proposed rule and
subjecting the rule to public notice and comment.217 Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s majority opinion also noted parenthetically that the Secretary’s
“‘significant expertise’ . . . in the context of ‘a complex and highly technical
regulatory program’” would ordinarily warrant deference.218 Despite the
evidence of delegation and expertise, however, the Court accorded the
Secretary’s interpretation of the MCCA only “respectful consideration” under
the Skidmore standard rather than full Chevron deference.219 Until the
Secretary completed his deliberations, considered all submissions, and
promulgated a definitive final rule, Chevron’s consensus would remain
unsatisfied and Skidmore, not Chevron, would apply. Blumer thus implicitly
rejects the notion that either delegation of lawmaking authority or agency
expertise alone is sufficient to trigger Chevron deference.220
212

Id. at 478.
Id. at 484-85 (citing Chi. Reg’l State Letter No. 22-94 from the Health Care Fin.
Admin. (July 1994), reprinted in Petition and Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 87a,
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952); Chi. Reg’l State Letter No. 51-93 from the Health Care
Fin. Admin. (Dec. 1993), reprinted in Petition and Appendix for Writ of Certiorari at 78a,
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952)).
214 Blumer, 534 U.S. at 485.
215 Id. at 478.
216 Id. at 496.
217 Id. at 485 (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 46,763, 46,765 (2001)).
218 Id. at 497 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1995)).
219 Id.
220 Although Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia dissented, all nine Justices agreed
that Skidmore, not Chevron, provided the appropriate standard of deference. See id. at 505
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001))
(arguing that the Secretary’s position was “devoid of any ‘power to persuade’” under
Skidmore because the Secretary had expressed different views over time). Blumer thus
challenges the assumption that Chevron’s overlapping rationales are merely redundant, as
213
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Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones
Telecommunications, Inc.

In other recent cases, the Supreme Court has cited Mead’s delegation fiction
at Step Zero without expressly addressing agency expertise, presidential
administration, deliberative process, or other leading rationales for Chevron
deference. It would be a mistake, however, to construe such cases as rejecting
Chevron’s consensus-based approach in favor of a streamlined congressional
delegation theory.
Consider, for instance, Global Crossing
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.,221 where
the Supreme Court upheld a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934.222 In explaining the basis
for its decision, the Court stated without elaboration that the FCC’s
interpretation merited Chevron deference because Congress had delegated
authority to the FCC to promulgate “regulations and orders with the force of
law.”223 While the Court did not expressly discuss the other leading rationales
for Chevron deference, neither did the Court give any indication that the FCC’s
decision-making process would not satisfy these other rationales. The Court’s
invocation of Mead’s delegation theory in Global Crossing and other recent
cases scarcely diminishes the continued salience of Chevron’s consensus.
* * *
If Karl Llewellyn is right that inductive reasoning – the “heaping up of
concrete instances” – most accurately reveals the law’s meaning, then a strong
argument can be made that Mead and its progeny counter-intuitively affirm
Chevron’s consensus under the veil of legal fiction.224 A close reading of the
Supreme Court’s recent cases suggests that Mead’s delegation fiction provides
an incomplete account of the Court’s decision-making process at Chevron Step
Zero. A far better explanation can be found in Chevron’s consensus: the

some scholars have suggested. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a
Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 690 (2007) (arguing that when tensions arise between
agency expertise and political accountability, “the executive may pursue either a
technocratic course or a political one; on the logic of Chevron, either approach is
permissible”). The better reading of Chevron and Mead is that none of the overlapping
rationales for deference is truly redundant; a single faulty thread in Chevron’s consensus
compromises the integrity of the whole weave. See, e.g., De La Mota v. U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2005).
221 127 S. Ct. 1513 (2007).
222 Id. at 1516 (holding that “the FCC’s application of § 201(b) [of the Communications
Act of 1934] to the carrier’s refusal to pay compensation is a reasonable interpretation of the
statute”).
223 Id. at 1522 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005)).
224 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 2
(William S. Hein & Co. 2007) (1930).
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Supreme Court applies Chevron in contexts where agencies formulate
regulatory policy through robust decision-making processes that reflect
delegated authority, expertise, political responsiveness and accountability,
deliberative rationality, and national uniformity. Conversely, the Supreme
Court withholds Chevron deference in contexts where one or more of these
rationales for deference are not satisfied. As the Court’s Chevron-related
decisions accumulate, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the Court has
not, in fact, embraced a strong congressional delegation theory that turns solely
upon delegation of lawmaking authority to the exclusion of other prevailing
rationales for Chevron deference. Rather, the Court employs congressional
delegation under Mead primarily as a heuristic for exploring the various core
rationales within Chevron’s consensus.225 The Court therefore grants Chevron
deference only in contexts where diverse political, philosophical, and
jurisprudential traditions favor flexible agency administration.
D.

The Puzzling Resilience of Mead’s Delegation Fiction

Assuming the foregoing analysis accurately captures the Supreme Court’s
recent Chevron jurisprudence, why has the Court not abandoned the
congressional delegation fiction in favor of a more transparent consensusbased approach?
It might be tempting to conclude the Justices actually believe they can
discern Congress’s intent to delegate interpretive authority from circumstantial
evidence in an agency’s enabling legislation. This hypothesis does not
withstand close scrutiny, however. The Supreme Court’s leading luminaries in
administrative law – Justices Breyer and Scalia – have confessed in separate
law review articles that the congressional delegation theory is a legal fiction.226
In Justice Scalia’s words, “the quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is
probably a wild-goose chase” because in most contexts “Congress neither (1)
intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency,
but rather (3) didn’t think about the matter at all.”227
Notwithstanding the delegation fiction’s formal inadequacy, Justices Breyer
and Scalia defend the congressional delegation fiction on functionalist
grounds. Justice Breyer asserts that the delegation fiction “has institutional
virtues” because it constrains judicial discretion; when judges ask whether

225

See H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF “AS IF” 39-42 (C.K. Ogden trans., 2d ed.
1935) (1924) (discussing “heuristic fictions”).
226 Breyer, supra note 73, at 370 (“[Courts] have looked to practical features of the
particular circumstance to decide whether it ‘makes sense,’ in terms of the need for fair and
efficient administration of that statute in light of its substantive purpose, to imply a
congressional intent that courts defer to the agency’s interpretation.”); Scalia, supra note
138, at 517 (“[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents merely a fiction, presumed intent,
and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can
legislate.”).
227 Scalia, supra note 138, at 517.

1314

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:1271

Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to an agency, they commit
themselves to scrutinizing the statute closely and providing persuasive policy
rationales for deference to administrative agencies.228 Justice Scalia adds that
once the Supreme Court has clarified the factors it will accept as evidence of
delegation, Congress should be able to adjust its legislative drafting practices
accordingly.229 By the Justices’ logic, Mead’s delegation fiction arguably
operationalizes theories of congressional policymaking and judicial restraint.230
The flaws in this functionalist defense of the delegation fiction should be
readily apparent. First, Justice Breyer’s assertion that the Court’s search for
congressional delegation constrains judicial reasoning is debatable, to say the
least. Indeed, the reverse is true: as a legal fiction of indeterminate content,
Mead liberates the Court from having to ground its application of Chevron
deference in any objectively verifiable criteria. Cloaking Chevron in Mead’s
delegation fiction allows the Supreme Court to “appeas[e] the longing for an
appearance of [methodological] conservatism,”231 while remaining free to
define Chevron’s domain based upon undisclosed normative criteria of its own
choosing. Far from enhancing judicial restraint and accountability, Mead’s
flexible delegation inquiry enhances judicial discretion and conceals judicial
policymaking.
Second, Justice Scalia’s assertion that the delegation fiction provides a
clearer standard to guide future congressional action is unpersuasive. One
need look no further than Justice Scalia’s own dissent in Mead to appreciate
that the congressional delegation fiction does not ipso facto ensure interpretive
clarity.232 Experience has shown, moreover, that Mead’s delegation fiction has
spawned confusion and discord in the circuit courts, which have failed to
appreciate the continuing relevance of Chevron’s consensus.233 There is little
228 See Breyer, supra note 73, at 371 (“Using these factors as a means of discerning a
hypothetical congressional intent about ‘deference’ . . . allows courts to allocate the lawinterpreting function between court and agency in a way likely to work best within any
particular statutory scheme.”).
229 Scalia, supra note 138, at 517; see also Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron – The
Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 824 (1990) (stating that
Congress’s awareness of Chevron and distrust of “executive branch interpretation” should
lead Congress to be more careful in its drafting).
230 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761,
798 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Deference]; Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine:
Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 824 (2002)
(arguing that the congressional delegation fiction “has resuscitated the axiom that Congress
is the primary source of authority to make law within our system of separation of powers”);
Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1439-40 (2007).
231 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 37 (1967).
232 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233 See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 10, at 1445-47 (identifying
inconsistencies in circuit courts’ application of Mead and concluding that Chevron’s domain
now hinges on whatever particular factors “the first panel to evaluate a particular
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reason to believe that members of Congress have found the delegation fiction
any more intelligible than the courts themselves.
If I am correct that the Supreme Court actually employs Mead’s delegation
fiction as a heuristic for the five core rationales in Chevron’s consensus,
concerns about judicial activism and doctrinal indeterminacy might fade
somewhat. But this observation simply demonstrates the inadequacy of
Mead’s nebulous delegation fiction as a positive theory of Chevron deference
and underscores the need for courts to develop a more transparent framework
for defining the scope of Chevron’s domain.
III. RECONSTRUCTING CHEVRON’S CONSENSUS
What you have been doing by the fiction, – could you, or could you not, have
done it without the fiction? If not, your fiction is a wicked lie: if yes, a
foolish one.234
Nearly a century ago, John Chipman Gray observed that “as a system of
Law becomes more perfect, . . . better definitions and rules are laid down
which enable us to dispense with the historic fictions which have been already
created. Such fictions are scaffolding, . . . but, after the building is erected,
serv[e] only to obscure it.”235 Lon Fuller would later elaborate upon Gray’s
scaffolding analogy, explaining that a legal “fiction is like a scaffolding in that
it can be removed with ease. The fiction seldom becomes a ‘vested interest’; it
does not gather about it a group of partisan defenders. No one will mourn its
passing.”236 According to this view, legal fictions function primarily to ease
the law’s transition toward a new regime. Once the new edifice has been
completed, however, the old scaffolding can be disassembled and discarded.
In this spirit, I propose that the time is ripe to set aside Mead’s congressional
delegation fiction and allow Chevron’s consensus to stand freely on its own
merits. Few would mourn Mead’s passing and the benefits flowing from an
express consensus-based approach would be significant. First, Chevron’s
consensus would clarify the scope of Chevron’s domain. Agencies would be
free to interpret ambiguous statutes flexibly as long as they employ procedures
reflecting rational deliberation and expertise, conducive to national uniformity,
consistent with actual congressional authorization, and subject to the
incumbent administration’s general guidance and accountability. Second,
Chevron’s pragmatic consensus would strengthen Chevron’s political stability
by disarming legal realists’ criticisms of Mead and laying the groundwork for
interpretive procedure” deigns to select); Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead
and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1895-96
(2006).
234 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 283 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1843).
235 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 35 (MacMillan Co.
1921) (1909).
236 FULLER, supra note 231, at 70; see also VAIHINGER, supra note 225, at 88.
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mutual respect and reciprocity among conflicting comprehensive theories of
the administrative state. Third, expressly endorsing Chevron as a multifactor
consensus would make the Supreme Court’s own decisions more transparent.
This enhanced transparency would in turn augment the Court’s political
accountability, aid Congress in drafting future legislation, and facilitate
decisional uniformity in the lower federal courts.
A.

Mapping Chevron’s Consensus

One virtue of Chevron’s consensus is that it draws a sharper distinction
between decision-making processes that fall within Chevron’s domain and
those beyond the pale. Rather than rely on Mead’s controversial delegation
fiction, a consensus-based inquiry at Step Zero would consider whether an
agency’s decision-making process could sustain a consensus between the
leading foundational theories for flexible agency administration. Courts
reviewing agency action might reasonably presume in the first instance that an
agency’s exercise of lawmaking authority merits Chevron deference. Where
litigants demonstrate that an agency’s decision-making process does not satisfy
one of Chevron’s overlapping rationales, however, the agency would not be
entitled to Chevron deference and courts would proceed to evaluate the
agency’s statutory construction under the residual Skidmore factors.237 This
consensus-based, burden-shifting framework would provide a far clearer
standard for defining Chevron’s domain than Mead’s nebulous delegation
fiction or Skidmore’s fuzzy balancing test.
The EPA rulemaking reviewed in Chevron represents one obvious locus of
consensus. However, agency statutory interpretations need not be adopted
through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to qualify for Chevron
deference. Under certain circumstances, a variety of agency policymaking
procedures could satisfy Chevron’s consensus, as courts have recognized under
Mead.238 For example, formal adjudications satisfy the cumulative criteria for
flexible agency administration under Chevron’s consensus.239 In INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre,240 the Supreme Court granted Chevron deference to a Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision interpreting the statutory language

237

See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 513 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)) (“Congressional delegation to an
administrative agency . . . may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to
engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rule-making, or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent.”).
239 See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987)); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417-19 (1992); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988)); see also Croley, supra note 163, at 10607 (discussing Chevron’s applicability to formal adjudications).
240 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
238
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“serious nonpolitical crime” under the Immigration and Nationality Act.241
The Court observed that Congress had expressly charged the Attorney General
“with the administration and enforcement” of the Act and specified that the
“determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions
of law shall be controlling.”242 The Attorney General, in turn, had “vested the
BIA with power to exercise the discretion and authority conferred upon the
Attorney General by law in the course of considering and determining cases
before it.”243 Having established congressional delegation to its satisfaction,
the Court proceeded to look beyond the delegation inquiry to other rationales
within Chevron’s consensus. The Court noted, for instance, that the BIA’s
expertise and responsiveness to presidential agenda-setting weighed strongly in
favor of Chevron deference – particularly given that the BIA’s adjudicatory
role entailed “sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations.”244 Thus, insofar as the BIA sought to give “ambiguous statutory
terms concrete meaning through [the deliberative, precedential] process of
case-by-case adjudication,” the Supreme Court reasoned that the BIA’s
statutory interpretations “should be accorded Chevron deference.”245 AguirreAguirre thus underscores the continued relevance of Chevron’s consensus in
formal adjudication as a guide to the scope of Chevron’s domain.
Conversely, Chevron’s consensus counsels against deference to statutory
interpretations developed through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
agency adjudication in the absence of congressional delegation, expertise,
uniformity, or political accountability.
By definition, formal agency
adjudication provides procedural safeguards that facilitate public participation
and agency deliberation;246 an agency’s failure to employ these mandatory
procedures would rule out Chevron’s deference. Administrative law judges
who lack policymaking authority would not receive deference under
241 Id. at 418 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994), amended by Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 307, 110 Stat.
3009-612 (1996)).
242 Id. at 424 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (Supp. III 1994) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1) (2000))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 Id. at 425 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998) (current version at 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(d)(i) (2008))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
244
Id. (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1671, 1682 (2007) (discussing circuit courts’ reluctance to grant Chevron deference
to the BIA’s interpretations of law based on skepticism about the BIA’s expertise).
245 Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
448-49 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
246 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(b), 555(b), 556(d), 557(c) (2000) (mandating that, under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), agencies must provide notice to persons potentially
affected by the agency’s action, allow for the presentation of evidence in oral or
documentary form, permit cross-examination by participating parties, and base findings and
conclusions of fact exclusively on record evidence).
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Chevron.247 Similarly, the consensus approach would withhold Chevron
deference from informal agency adjudications and rulemakings that
systematically neglect expert evidence248 or impede the establishment of a
unitary national standard.249 On the rulemaking side, the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements for informal rulemaking would be insufficient to justify
flexible agency administration where agencies lack a reasonable claim to
expertise or their chosen interpretation would not provide a uniform national
standard. Thus, Chevron’s consensus challenges the popular misconception
that all agency statutory constructions adopted through notice-and-comment
rulemaking merit Chevron deference.250
The consensus approach also provides a useful framework for clarifying
Chevron’s application to other forms of agency policymaking. For example,
the U.S. Commerce Department’s antidumping determinations, which do not
fall neatly into either the rulemaking or adjudication paradigms, could qualify
for Chevron deference based on either expertise or political accountability –
but only where the agency voluntarily engages in an open deliberative process

247

Examples include administrative law judges within the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission (“FMSHRC”) and the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (“OSHRC”). See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991) (holding
that the OSHRC was not entitled to deference because Congress had committed
policymaking authority to another agency body, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration).
248 See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (denying
Chevron deference to the Department of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act, a statute of general applicability, because the agency lacked expertise).
249 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-80, 482 (1999) (denying
Chevron deference where the statute was administered by multiple federal agencies). But
see Individual Reference Servs. Group v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2001)
(granting Chevron deference where agencies authored a coordinated interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory term). Some circuits have elevated the uniformity inquiry by framing
Chevron as an inquiry into whether the agency interpretation would have decisive
precedential value within the agency. See, e.g., Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d
1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzalez, 449 F.3d 915, 922
(9th Cir. 2006)). Even these courts have recognized, however, that precedential uniformity
is insufficient for Chevron deference unless other factors are satisfied, such as the
administrator’s “imprimatur” of authority. Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 922 (citing 8
C.F.R. § 100.3(d)(1) (2006)) (describing an immigration judge’s decision as “without
precedential value and without the imprimatur of the Attorney General or the Attorney
General’s delegate”); see also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001).
250 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 227 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“The SSA’s recently enacted regulations emerged from
notice-and-comment rulemaking and merit deference. No more need be said.”); Groff v.
United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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that results in a precedential standard.251 Similar standards could apply to
agency interpretive rules, giving structure to Mead’s vague admonition that,
although interpretive rules “enjoy no Chevron status as a class,” some
interpretive rules might yet fall within Chevron’s domain.252 Even agency
“interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines” – traditionally “beyond the Chevron pale”253 – might
sometimes warrant Chevron deference if they emerge from a robust decisionmaking process that achieves precedential authority within the agency.254 In
these contexts and many others, Chevron’s multifactor consensus would set the
Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence on a more coherent and intelligible
foundation.
As for recent scholarly efforts to extend Chevron deference to new fields
such as criminal law and foreign relations law,255 Chevron’s pluralist
consensus sounds a cautionary note. Although the executive branch’s superior
expertise furnishes an important functional justification for judicial deference
in these fields, the Chevron analogy loses force as consideration shifts to other
factors in Chevron’s pluralist consensus such as congressional delegation,
deliberative rationality, or regulatory uniformity. For example, it would be a
mistake to apply Chevron-style deference to the State Department’s
interpretation of multilateral treaties and customary norms, because this
approach would undermine one of Chevron’s core rationales – regulatory
uniformity – by inviting conflict between domestic law and international
consensus.256 The case for applying Chevron deference to federal criminal law
is similarly flawed. Even those who advocate applying Chevron deference in

251

See, e.g., Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1379-82
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (granting Chevron deference to a Commerce Department antidumping
determination).
252 Mead, 533 U.S. at 232 (citing Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1463, 1472-73 (1992)). Compare Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (granting deference to an interpretive rule issued by the
Secretary of the Interior), with Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (1991) (stating that “interpretive
rules” are not entitled to the same level of “deference as norms that derive from the exercise
of . . . delegated lawmaking powers” (citations omitted)).
253 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
254 See id. at 230; cf. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996) (“Of course we deny
deference ‘to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings,
or administrative practice.’ The deliberateness of such positions, if not indeed their
authoritativeness, is suspect.” (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
212 (1988))).
255 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
256 Criddle, supra note 25, at 1930-33; see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note 25, at 124849 (arguing that courts cannot reasonably infer a delegation of interpretive authority to the
executive branch in contexts where treaties or customary norms operate as constraints upon
executive authority).
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criminal law recognize that Congress has delegated interpretive authority over
federal criminal law to the courts, not the executive branch.257 Moreover, the
Justice Department’s interpretations of criminal statutes generally arise as ad
hoc litigation positions, which do not necessarily reflect the robust deliberation
or national uniformity required for Chevron deference. To honor Chevron’s
spirit, federal courts should resist appeals to extend Chevron-style deference
literally or by analogy to these and other contexts that fall outside the scope of
Chevron’s multifactor consensus.
Chevron’s consensus thus illuminates the borders of Chevron’s domain.
Where all of Chevron’s five core rationales are satisfied, federal courts should
defer to agencies’ flexible interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Conversely,
where any of these core rationales remains unsatisfied, courts should determine
instead whether the agency’s preferred interpretation is otherwise persuasive
under Skidmore’s residual balancing test. Reconstructing Chevron’s consensus
in this manner would provide a more coherent guide to Chevron’s domain than
Mead’s nebulous delegation fiction.
B.

Chevron Deference, Legal Pluralism, and Political Stability

A second virtue of the consensus approach is that it offers a politically stable
foundation for Chevron deference. At a time when no single comprehensive
theory of the administrative state has gained universal approval and diverse
theories of statutory interpretation abound, a pragmatic consensus-based
approach fosters greater harmony in Chevron jurisprudence. Whether a judge
approaches problems in administrative law from the perspective of pluralist or
civic republican theory, inherent executive authority or deliberative
democracy, agency independence or political accountability, Chevron’s
consensus offers a serviceable framework for addressing the judge’s core
jurisprudential commitments while according reciprocity to other judges with
different views.
To be sure, reasonable judges might continue to disagree as to whether
agency expertise, political accountability, congressional delegation, or some
other factor provides the best theoretical grounding for Chevron deference.
From time to time, cases will fall outside the scope of Chevron’s consensus,
triggering actual conflicts between its competing rationales. In such cases,
courts should pass over Chevron deference and apply the residual Skidmore
test to determine whether agency interpretations merit deference in the face of
persistent theoretical friction. Statutory interpretations adopted through
Skidmore’s balancing test would not qualify for flexible agency administration
– Chevron’s exclusive domain – but would instead be subject to traditional
principles of stare decisis. This approach would enhance the political stability

257

Kahan, supra note 24, at 474 (explaining that Congress allows for ambiguity in
federal criminal statutes and is “perfectly aware that this approach [shifts] a great deal of
law-defining authority to courts”).

2008]

CHEVRON’S CONSENSUS

1321

of Chevron Step Zero in the face of enduring theoretical pluralism and draw a
more coherent distinction between Chevron and Skidmore.
Chevron’s antifoundationalist consensus will not appeal to everyone. Some
might agree with Ronald Dworkin that the Supreme Court should pursue a
unitary theory that would lend greater coherence to the interrelationship
between courts and agencies in statutory interpretation.258 Significant practical
obstacles impede Dworkin’s quest for coherence, however. At present, no
single rationale for Chevron deference can provide a politically stable
foundation for flexible agency administration because none has achieved
anything close to a consensus among judges and scholars. Nor do any of the
prevailing rationales appear likely to emerge victorious from the current scrum.
Thus, the Dworkinian yearning for a comprehensive theory of court-agency
relations, admirable though it may be, does not at present furnish a viable
alternative to Chevron’s consensus. Until a usable comprehensive theory takes
shape, the consensus-based approach best satisfies the pragmatic imperative
for a second-best solution to stabilize Chevron’s domain amidst enduring
theoretical pluralism.
C.

Demystifying Chevron’s Domain

Piercing Mead’s delegation fiction would also demystify the Supreme
Court’s decision-making process at Chevron Step Zero for the benefit of
Congress, agencies, and the lower federal courts. For the past seven years,
Mead’s delegation fiction has cast a shadow of uncertainty over Chevron’s
domain, perplexing courts and commentators alike. To address this problem,
the Supreme Court should acknowledge Mead’s delegation theory for what it is
– a legal fiction – and candidly invoke Chevron’s five-factor consensus as the
definitive test for Chevron deference.259
Judicial candor has many advocates, of course. David Shapiro has
emphasized that courts’ duty to provide reasoned explanations for their
decisions – “grounds of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended –
serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power.”260

258
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 265 (1986). For example, judges and scholars
who defend Chevron as an extension of the President’s constitutional powers would likely
oppose a consensus-based approach to Chevron deference.
259 Professor Bressman has argued in a similar vein that courts should “simply . . .
acknowledge that Chevron is based on a fiction about congressional intent in the service of
broader democratic values.” Bressman, Deference, supra note 230, at 765.
260 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987)
(footnote omitted). But see Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1979) (arguing that the
law’s legitimacy depends more on perception than reality and that a judicial system’s
“paramount” objective may be simply to provide an “authoritative resolution” to disputes).
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The argument for judicial candor “carries special force” for judges “in a
constitutional democracy,”261 observes Peter Smith:
Specifically, because a requirement of candor makes transparent a judge’s
reasons, it also makes transparent his choices. Sometimes those choices
will be factually contingent, and sometimes they will be purely
normative. When the choices are factually contingent, the public – lay
people, political officials in other branches, and scholars – can measure
the descriptive validity of the factual claims. And, more important, when
the choices are normative, candor enables the public to assess both the
appropriateness in general of judges’ making such choices and the
desirability of the particular normative choice at issue in the case.262
Judicial candor also serves the interests of justice by illuminating the law’s
application for those who are themselves subject to it.263
Mead’s delegation fiction does not rest easily with the constitutional
imperative of judicial candor. To be sure, Justices Scalia and Breyer might be
right that courts could employ Mead’s delegation fiction to operationalize a
theory of judicial restraint.264 But to the extent courts actually deploy Mead’s
delegation inquiry without acknowledging its fictional character, the fog of
fiction can also obscure judicial self-deception and subterfuge. This threat is
arguably heightened in the Chevron context where courts lack empirically
verifiable evidence of actual congressional intent. Because courts must infer
congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority from ambiguous
evidence, they can easily manipulate the delegation fiction to grant or deny
Chevron deference based solely on how they wish to decide particular cases.265
Moreover, whether or not courts employ legal fictions generally as a “cover for
rascality,”266 as Bentham memorably quipped, the fact remains that Mead’s
delegation fiction tends to undermine judicial candor in practice by cloaking
the deeper normative judgments that sustain Chevron’s consensus. Therefore,
advocates of judicial candor are likely to greet Mead’s delegation fiction with
suspicion.

261

Smith, supra note 230, at 1482.
Id. at 1482-83.
263 See Diver, supra note 74, at 575 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63-65
(2d ed. 1969)) (“As Lon Fuller has argued, the ‘internal morality’ of law requires that it be
comprehensible to those whose conduct it regulates.”).
264 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
265 See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 825-27.
266 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on
Government, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 511 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart
eds., The Athlone Press 1977) (1838); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, LETTERS ON SCOTCH
REFORM (1808), reprinted in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3, 13 (John Bowring ed.,
1962) (“Fiction [in law is] a willful falsehood, uttered by a judge, for the purpose of giving
to injustice the colour of justice.”).
262
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In contrast, the Supreme Court could enhance the transparency of its
deference jurisprudence by employing Chevron’s consensus. Under the
consensus-based approach, the Court would engage in a more robust form of
public reasoning, explaining in concrete terms why an agency’s decisionmaking process satisfies or does not satisfy each of the rationales for flexible
agency administration. Where any of the leading rationales for deference
remains unsatisfied, the Skidmore test would similarly require the Court to
address each of the rationales for deference and explain why certain factors
should overcome others in deciding whether deference is appropriate to the
statutory interpretation under review. The consensus framework thus
transforms the controversial Chevron/Skidmore distinction into a useful device
for promoting judicial candor and opening judicial reasoning to public
scrutiny, holding judges accountable for their deference determinations.
By making the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence more accessible and
intelligible, the consensus-based approach would also foster decisional
uniformity in the circuit courts. Federal courts would no longer have to parse
the tea leaves of Supreme Court decisions such as Mead and Barnhart to
determine which comprehensive rationale for Chevron deference is currently in
vogue. Chevron’s consensus would thus lay the foundation for a more uniform
Chevron jurisprudence throughout the federal system.
D.

Legal Fictions All the Way Down

Although Chevron’s consensus has many functional advantages over
Mead’s congressional delegation fiction, it is not a panacea for the legal
fictions that pervade Chevron jurisprudence. The ubiquity of legal fictions in
statutory interpretation generally, and in Chevron jurisprudence specifically, is
reminiscent of the classic tale recounted by Justice Scalia in Rapanos v. United
States:267
[A]n Eastern guru affirms that the earth is supported on the back of a
tiger. When asked what supports the tiger, he says it stands upon an
elephant; and when asked what supports the elephant he says it is a giant
turtle. When asked, finally, what supports the giant turtle, he is briefly
taken aback, but quickly replies “Ah, after that it is turtles all the way
down.”268
The more closely one scrutinizes the various rationales for Chevron
deference, the clearer it becomes that Chevron’s revolution, like the guru’s
earth, rests on legal fictions “all the way down.” Chevron’s various
267

547 U.S. 715 (2006).
Id. at 754 n.14 (paraphrasing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
28-29 (1973)). In Chevron itself, Justice Stevens cited Roscoe Pound’s assertion that the
very concept of “interpretation” could be characterized as a “general fiction” insofar as it
obscures a court’s prescriptive function. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.10 (1984) (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON
LAW 174-75 (1921)).
268
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comprehensive rationales are each legal fictions to the extent they depend upon
contextually contingent factual assumptions.269 Indeed, the very concept of a
consensus in Chevron jurisprudence might be characterized as a legal fiction.
Although Chevron achieved unanimity within the Supreme Court, flexible
agency administration has not achieved unanimous approval within the legal
academy.270 Moreover, the search for zones of consensus in Chevron
jurisprudence has a fictional quality given the proliferation of rationales for
Chevron deference. As a matter of practical necessity, courts have no choice
but to confine their inquiry at Step Zero to a limited set of factors, such as the
five core rationales discussed in Chevron, Mead, and Barnhart. For these
reasons alone, Chevron’s consensus arguably falls short of a genuine
consensus and remains firmly entrenched in legal fictions.
Nevertheless, the idea that Chevron’s consensus rests on legal fictions
should not be viewed as cause for alarm. As Eben Moglen and Richard Pierce
have stressed, Chevron is hardly unique in its reliance on legal fictions; “all
interpretive regimes are built on a series of [legal] fictions.”271 Moreover, even
assuming courts could purge Chevron jurisprudence of its legal fictions, it is
not self-evident that this course of action would be desirable. “If all fictions
were eliminated,” R.A. Samek cautions, “we would be saddled with the dead
fictions of yesterday. . . . To engage in a witch-hunt for fictions is to entrench
the doctrine of the day.”272
Rather than attempt to eradicate all legal fictions from Chevron
jurisprudence, courts should focus their energies on selecting interpretive
principles that foster political stability and advance rule-of-law values, while
candidly acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of their chosen fictions.
Chevron’s consensus substantially advances these objectives. By employing
Chevron’s two-step test exclusively in contexts where all of the leading
rationales counsel deference, the Supreme Court could clarify Chevron’s
domain, broaden its appeal, and bolster its political stability. At the same time,
the consensus-based approach would provide the flexibility needed to allow
Chevron’s domain to evolve over time in response to new theoretical
perspectives and institutional arrangements. As today’s leading theories for
Chevron deference wax and wane and other theories arise to take their place,
269 See Moglen & Pierce, supra note 162, at 1210, 1213-15; Smith, supra note 230, at
1470 (characterizing as “new legal fictions” the utilization of over-inclusive socio-political
factual presumptions to obscure contestable normative judgments).
270 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 144, at 456; Tyler, supra note 57, at 1430.
271 Moglen & Pierce, supra note 162, at 1213; see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 167 (Tudor Publ’g Co. 1936) (1930) (“[J]udges have failed to see . . . that, in
a sense, all legal rules, principles, precepts, concepts, standards – all generalized
statements of law – are fictions.”); FULLER, supra note 231, at 2. But see Cass R. Sunstein,
Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1990) (arguing that legal fictions
“are not indispensable” but are rather “obstacles to thought” and should be replaced with
“interpretive principles – ones that can be defended in substantive or institutional terms”).
272 R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290, 313, 315 (1981).
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the consensus would reposition the borders of Chevron’s domain to reflect
these developments. Properly applied, therefore, Chevron’s consensus would
lend clarity, stability, and transparency to Chevron’s domain while satisfying
the needs of a dynamic, pluralist society over time.
CONCLUSION
If Chevron has taken a seat alongside Marbury and Brown in the pantheon
of American public law, the decision’s pluralist vision sets it apart as a
distinctly postmodern super-precedent. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
Justice Stevens’s unanimous Chevron opinion does not embrace any single
rationale for deference to agency statutory interpretation. Instead, Chevron
clears a space for flexible agency administration at the intersection between
several leading rationales for deference: congressional delegation,
administrative expertise, agency political responsiveness and accountability,
deliberative rationality, and national uniformity.
In Mead, the Supreme Court appeared to abandon Chevron’s pragmatic
consensus by endorsing congressional delegation as the touchstone for
Chevron deference. By all accounts, Mead has sown confusion and discord in
the circuit courts. What Mead’s critics have failed to appreciate, however, is
that the Supreme Court actually employs the congressional delegation theory
instrumentally to sustain Chevron’s consensus. Where agency decisionmaking processes satisfy all of the leading rationales for deference, the Court
applies Chevron. Conversely, where any of the leading rationales for
deference remains unsatisfied, the Court evaluates agency statutory
interpretations under the residual Skidmore test.
The time has come to dismantle Mead’s delegation fiction and expressly
reconstruct Chevron’s consensus. In future cases, the Supreme Court should
acknowledge candidly that Chevron’s consensus governs the scope of
Chevron’s application. Affirming Chevron’s consensus in this manner would
clarify Chevron’s scope, bolster Chevron’s political stability, and promote
judicial accountability in federal statutory interpretation.

